

# Military Intelligence



PB 34-91-3  
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1991

*Changing  
Roles*

# Military Intelligence

**PB 34-91-3 JULY-SEPTEMBER 1991**

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# VANTAGE POINT

## Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr

I want to continue the thrust of my last column; that is, to keep you apprised of the changes impacting our Army and the MI Corps. Events are moving rapidly, as are the changes resulting from these events. I want to make sure you're provided all the information I have on these changes.

On June 18, we took a big step toward fulfilling our dream of truly making Fort Huachuca the Home of MI: We broke ground for the first phase of the construction of new facilities to accommodate the move of the Intelligence School Devens (ISD) to Fort Huachuca. This construction, worth \$94 million, will build seven barracks, two dining facilities, two applied instruction buildings, a SIGINT/EW maintenance facility, and new utilities and roads in the academic complex.

This is the continuation of the realization of a dream. When we assumed command of Fort Huachuca on October 1, 1990, the post became the true home of MI, and now we're starting to build facilities to enable us to consolidate our two major training institutions at that home. In addition to this first phase of construction, we'll award contracts worth \$44 million over the next 2 years to build more academic buildings, including a \$20 million Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) training facility, a self-contained NCO Academy, and athletic and medical facilities.

We'll start the move of ISD elements in FY 92 and complete it in FY 94, as new facilities are finished. Cryptologic training activities at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, and Corry Naval Station, Florida, will continue at those locations under the Interservice Training Review Office (ITRO) Agreement, even after ISD completes its move to Fort Huachuca. However, we'll resubordinate these activities under the 111th MI Brigade in FY 92.

As we begin to reduce the size of the Army and the MI Corps, we've begun a total intelligence functional review to make sure we retain coherence across the branch as well as the ability to satisfy commanders' requirements at all echelons. Our overall reductions will be proportional to the rest of the Army. However, it's essential that as our Army gets smaller, we increase our capabilities to provide the Army the intelligence

support it needs to properly focus resources and combat power.

To accomplish this, Brigadier General John Stewart has been detailed to us to lead the functional review team. The team will include full time representatives from the Intelligence Center, INSCOM, and DCSINT, DA, as well as part time representatives from virtually all major intelligence commands, staffs, and agencies in the Army, including the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and the National Guard Bureau. The team will complete its review this September. It will brief its conclusions and recommendations to the MI general officer leadership and then at an MI G2/Commanders Conference scheduled for late September or early October.

The approved conclusions and recommendations will be captured in the next iteration of the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP), which should be published by early calendar year 1992. The relook will include every discipline, every echelon, and every MI MOS/area of concentration, and both the Active and Reserve Components. Another key ingredient of this effort will be to capture appropriate lessons learned from DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE.

INSCOM is reinforcing its commitment to the functional review/AIMP process by providing a task force of 13 people headed by Colonel Dave Vore. The task force will be permanently assigned to the Intelligence Center this summer. It will play a major role in helping us ensure total coherence across the MI force and in realizing the "seamless" system of intelligence systems we must have to be successful in the future.

We have revamped our MI Officer Basic Course to make it more tactically relevant. It's now one of the best and most tactically focused in TRADOC. We're in the process of restructuring our MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC) to bring it more in line with the needs of the tactical Army and to enable us to put officers in our "must fill" positions who have the requisite qualifications to succeed. The focus of the new advanced course will continue to be on preparing our officers to perform as company commanders and S2s; but it will concurrently give them sufficient background in all intelligence disciplines to

*(Continued on page 47)*



## Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

The Military Intelligence NCO Academy was activated on July 1, 1987, concurrently with the MI Corps activation. Since then, the academy has experienced rapid and positive growth. The academy's mission is to provide leader and specialty related training to skill level 2 through 4 NCOs. The academy offers the Basic NCO Course (BNCOC) and the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC). Here, NCOs receive training in leadership and the tactical and technical skills necessary to lead, train, and supervise soldiers.

BNCOC consists of two phases. In Phase I, which covers the first 2 weeks, NCOs learn the common leader tasks developed by the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. These tasks are designed to teach hands-on, performance oriented, war-fighting skills, including marksmanship, NCO efficiency rating preparation, counseling, physical fitness, and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.

Phase II focuses on the technical skills for the seven MOSs: 96B, Intelligence Analyst; 96D, Imagery Analyst; 96H, Aerial Intelligence Specialist; 96R, Ground Surveillance System Supervisor; 97B, CI Agent; 97E, Interrogator; and 97G, Counter-Signals Intelligence Specialist. Soldiers in each MOS train on career management field (CMF) common subjects such as collection management and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. They conduct field and situational training exercises and develop the supervisory skills that squad or section leaders need.

The BNCOC teaching methodology uses small group instruction, with a leader to student ratio of 1 to 16. Learning takes place in an active environment, with an emphasis on sharing experiences. The soldiers/students are responsible for their own learning. All these elements are blended with a strong doctrinal foundation. All students must prepare in advance for the training, do homework, and participate in classroom activities. They aren't allowed to take notes because it interferes with class participation. We're not interested in NCOs memorizing solutions or quantities of information. The goal is to develop open minded, innovative thinkers—responsible risk takers.

ANCOC annually trains approximately 500

senior NCOs from CMFs 33, 96, and 98. The CMF 33 NCO has a 3-week "track" which is front loaded. All three CMF groups train together for 10 weeks of merger or "fusion" training. At the SFC grade, the soldiers are platoon level supervisors. They're trained to supervise and manage the many intelligence MOSs they're likely to encounter worldwide. The training philosophy at ANCOC is identical to BNCOC: The goal is to train soldiers "how to think" versus "what to think."

The MI NCO Academy's future is bright. The consolidation of academies from Fort Devens and Fort Huachuca into a single organization with brand new facilities is exciting. The preliminary reports, official and unofficial, from Operation DESERT STORM speak well of NCO performance and will ensure the role of the NCO in the smaller, more mobile Army of the future.

NCOs are the driving force in getting the mission accomplished. They need to project a caring attitude and train soldiers with a go-to-war attitude. The NCO Academy here at Fort Huachuca puts it together—leading, caring, and training the NCOs of the future.



# FROM THE EDITOR

***"Our professional journals—designed to reach the broadest sweep of audiences across the widest range of issues—will be especially important in the years ahead. Each of us must assume a greater and more personal role in the reading of, and writing for, our journals and in the exchange of ideas and thoughts."***

**General Carl E. Vuono  
U.S. Army Retired**


This issue features articles by authors from a variety of professional and technical backgrounds. Many are branched in specialties other than Military Intelligence. Others are from the Reserve Component. Some are from other services, or work in joint assignments. Officers, NCOs, and civilians are represented. They all present issues important to the MI community. It's gratifying to get so many quality articles from such a broad audience—that's what makes a professional bulletin work!

Please keep these fine articles coming. The exchange of ideas and thoughts in a medium like MIPB is extremely important. We need input from people of varied backgrounds. If you've considered writing an article but were reluctant to because you're not an active duty MI officer, start typing! You probably have something important to say to the rest of us!

Of special interest in this issue are two articles from Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel. Although some people in the SOF and MI communities hate to admit it, SOF and MI missions are often interrelated, and often their success largely depends on how well the two communities work together or informally interact. This is especially true in Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) situations. Currently the two communities jointly are writing some of the most important doctrine we'll see in the next 10 years. I'm publishing these articles to help foster a better understanding of SOF missions among MI professionals.

In this issue, we've added Proponent Notes. This will be a regular column from the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI). The success of this column depends in part on your feedback. The same holds true for the Total Force and Career Notes columns. Please don't hesitate to write or call the points of contact listed in the columns if you feel something they've addressed needs further discussion or clarification. Letters to the editor are also a good forum for discussing anything that appears in the bulletin.

The bottom line is that by reading and writing for our professional journals, we participate in shaping the future of our Army. As General Vuono's comments imply, we should make these things our duty.



Sincerely,

*John A. Horvath*

# LETTERS

## Dear Editor:

Your article, in the January-March 1991 issue, "Perestroika and the Soviet Military," was very enjoyable and informative reading. In my view, the article presented the current ranges of thinking concerning the effects of Perestroika within the Soviet military.

Recent actions by the Soviet military in quelling dissent in the Baltic States and in Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan indicate the Soviet military hasn't bowed out of the military picture entirely. On the other hand, recent events such as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the failure by the Soviet military to meet semiannual conscription quotas, and continuing serious morale problems among junior and middle level officers indicate the Soviet military is far short of its former ability to conduct multifront military operations.

In fact, the view of many is that because of the deteriorating economic situation, Gorbachev, Perestroika, and Glasnost are either dying or dead issues. The bottom line is the Soviets can't have both "guns and butter." As a nation, they must decide which is more critical, and at the moment **butter** appears to be winning.

Michael S. Evancevich  
USAIC Threat Office  
Fort Huachuca, AZ

## Dear Editor:

Colonel Mesch's Total Force column in the April-June 1991 issue raised important issues on intelligence training in the

Reserve Components (RCs). An important DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM lesson I observed while working in First Army is that MOS qualification and NCO professional development for the RC soldier must be done before mobilization. The mobilization process isn't intended to provide basic MOS and NCO Education System (NCOES) training.

The Intelligence Training Army Area Schools (ITAAS) are the primary intelligence MOS and NCOES trainers for the RCs. They teach courses the Proponent has developed for RC soldiers (USAR and National Guard). The ITAAS continue to be a valuable asset for the Total Force, providing training the Active Component schools can't provide.

First Army ITAAS supported DESERT SHIELD with a mobile training team which was given 24 hours notice before it was sent to train personnel in a mobilizing MI unit. From September 17 to 26, the team trained 10 soldiers in their level 10 skills. Because of the training, the soldiers were able to deploy with their unit, enabling the unit to meet its deployment strength.

I mention this not only to point out the valuable contribution of our Reserve brethren, but also to highlight why I'm concerned with Colonel Mesch's proposal to consolidate the ITAAS at Fort Huachuca. While consolidation might provide some benefit for the Intelligence Center, it almost certainly will reduce support to

the RC during both mobilization and peacetime. Let me elaborate.

Currently, the ITAAS are significantly limited because they lack assigned instructors. The ITAAS recruits instructors from Reserve MI units and the Individual Ready Reserve. Colonel Mesch identified this as a problem during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. FORSCOM recognized this before DESERT STORM and, to correct the situation, has proposed a new TDA which includes instructor positions.

I have no argument with an ITAAS being located at Fort Huachuca. First Army's ITAAS is presently collocated with the Intelligence School, Fort Devens, and this situation continues to prove beneficial to both the USAR forces and the TRADOC school. The benefits, however, aren't enough to warrant total centralization at the TRADOC Proponent. The USAR forces school dispersion reflects the nature of training the RC.

Colonel Mesch views centralization as a means to "avoid unnecessary duplication of classes, ensure maximum attendance by filling all seats, ensure instructors are recharged regularly at the Intelligence Center, and provide quality control from the Proponent." Let's consider these points.

First, ITAAS, like other USAR forces schools, participate in the DA Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR). The SMDR is designed to iden-

*(Continued on page 48)*



## Small Scale Agriculture: **HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN WIN THE DRUG WAR**

By Captain Michael R. Ligon

The apparent collapse of the Iron Curtain has brought about profound and far-reaching changes on the international scene. Our Army will be a key participant as our nation defines a new role for itself. DESERT SHIELD/STORM is the most obvious example of our nation's changing international priorities. It's increasingly important that MI professionals understand the world and regional dynamics that influence potential areas of conflict in which our nation may become

involved. One area in which we can expect to see a growing MI commitment is in the "War on Drugs."

The term "War on Drugs" is a misnomer for us in the Army. Our technical term which encompasses counterdrugs is Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). LIC is a politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. LIC actions range from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures to the use of armed force. LIC is often characterized by constraints on weaponry and tactics, as well as the



level and duration of violence.<sup>1</sup> Counterdrugs is a mission under peacetime contingency operations, one of the four operational categories of LIC.

The U.S. Government uses a three-pronged approach for counterdrugs:

- CONUS education and treatment.
- Border interdiction (including international waters and airways).
- OCONUS source disruption.<sup>2</sup>

We have the social agencies to provide drug education and treatment, and the conventional military means to interdict the drug flow into the U.S. (effective enough, at least, to raise prices on the street). However, the weak link lies in not having a viable economic alternative to offer drug-producing nations—one that's low-level and cost-effective and can be used as a politically palatable tool for source disruption. Our Army, through peacetime contingency operations, could play an important role here, provided we learn to understand and respond to the needs and desires of the people who provide that key drug source.

Currently, our government's policies meet some U.S. and host-nation political resistance. Many people perceive we lack a unified approach in dealing with the diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures caused by the almost systemic drug problem in some poorer countries. A conventional military approach has not provided the answers to these countries' problems. Indeed, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori recently refused U.S. military aid. In his opinion, such aid would more deeply involve both the U.S. and Peruvian military in a violent struggle with the Drug Cartel.

Both President Fujimori and Colombian President Cesar Gaviria want to "demilitarize" their anti-Cartel efforts, using only their "elite" units and police for drug enforcement. They view the U.S. military approach as "politically volatile, sparking fears of escalating violence and eventual direct U.S. involvement, leading to a "South American Vietnam."<sup>3</sup>

Clausewitz stated there is no such thing as a purely military strategy to war.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, U.S. Army foreign internal defense and development doctrine states the military in and of itself is not a nation builder.<sup>5</sup> However, until we attack the "strategic center of gravity" by removing the logistic support base for the drug cartels—the small farmer—we'll continue to be on the defensive.<sup>6</sup> To win the Drug War, our nation must come up with a combined political, military, and economic plan that improves the living conditions of

small farmers. Our plan must give farmers positive incentives to grow something other than drug crops.

To formulate an effective plan, we first need to understand the problem. About 60 percent of the world's farmers own less than 11 acres of land, and 35 percent own less than two and a half acres. Traditionally, these farmers use their land to grow cash crops. They sell their harvest at market to buy the foods they need to live on.

This is just the opposite of how it should be. Just as financial counselors advise clients to "pay yourself first," so should farmers be able to feed themselves first. When farmers can't provide for their families, they become dissatisfied with the system. As a result, they're often attracted to "national liberation" groups, or resort to growing the coca leaf or heroin poppy to supplement (or replace) their incomes.

### Benson Institute

The Benson Institute for Small Scale Agriculture has a program that might solve this political, economic, and psychological dilemma. Since 1976, the Benson Institute has been teaching small farmers to be self-sufficient. Using local resources, the Institute teaches farmers to set aside parcels of their land for growing a variety of crops in the proportions needed to provide a well balanced diet.

Using this system, Nino Espinoza (father of eight) and Humberto Canarte (father of seven) of Portoviejo, Ecuador, were able to feed their families a balanced diet and still raise their average annual incomes from \$169 to \$1,135—almost an 800 percent increase! Ecuador's President Leon Febres Cordero was so impressed with the program he requested it be implemented on a national scale.<sup>7</sup>

While the increased yields were remarkable, the system was not really new, simply innovative. To plant different crops on a piece of land is hardly worth mentioning; but to plant them in specific amounts that satisfy nutritional needs of a family, making the family agriculturally self-sufficient is something else.<sup>8</sup> The start-up cost for each farmer averaged \$50 to \$150—easily repaid the first year under the Benson system. What other foreign assistance program offers so much "bang for the buck" at such low cost?

### PRODEM

Logically, the next step is to find the money at an interest rate the farmer can afford. Rather

than doling out the funds, the money should be loaned to prevent social and psychological dependence on the government. One possible source is the Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Microenterprise (PRODEM). PRODEM is a private organization that has been giving low interest loans to market vendors in the "informal sector" of La Paz, Bolivia, for almost 3 years.

The "informal sector" is that segment of the city's economy considered outside the mainstream. Most vendors in this sector are Aymaran Indian women who normally have to buy their vending goods from truckers who haul produce from the countryside. The truckers sell the produce to the women on credit—for as much as 10 percent a day! PRODEM has found that with an initial loan for as little as \$50 at 3 percent interest, incomes increase 50 to 100 percent.<sup>9</sup>

Combining the Benson Institute's Small Scale Agriculture program with PRODEM's financing techniques and applying them to the worldwide small farm dilemma could remove the "strategic center of gravity" for the insurgent and the drug trafficker, at a fraction of the cost of strategies now used. Of course, this program would meet resistance from insurgents, drug-traffickers, and bureaucrats who want to protect their turf.

### Overcoming Resistance

To overcome resistance, we need coordinated political emphasis and military support. Without political resolve, the program will go nowhere. With it, not only do both governments (ours and theirs) get more "bang for the buck," but also the farmers see that the host-nation government is responsive to their problems. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that insurgents attempt to exploit.<sup>10</sup> Once farmers perceive this responsiveness, the economic and political tide turns in favor of the government.

As the perceptual tide turns, ground-level intelligence sources may surface. Army Special Forces introduced this approach as the "hearts and minds" theory in South Vietnam. The "hearts and minds" theory holds that if the host-nation government can gain the people's support, the people will—

- Withhold information and material support from the insurgents (and drug-traffickers) and avoid doing their bidding.
- Give information about insurgents to the government.
- Support public programs.
- Volunteer assistance to help win the war.

The military must send advisors who, to be effective, understand from firsthand experience the principles underlying rural development. They need to go to the people—live, serve, and plan with them; and build on what the people have by using an integrated approach.<sup>11</sup>

**FM 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict**, spells out the integrated organizational approach needed for counterinsurgency or counterdrugs. The most important unit in that structure is the regional area control center, because it's the lowest level of administration capable of coordinating all counterinsurgency programs.<sup>12</sup> By "plugging in" the Benson/PRODEM strategy at this level, the appropriate agency uses the appropriate tool.

### Special Operations Command

Because it's politically sensitive to send conventional U.S. forces into other countries, those forces should focus on border interdiction. We should employ units trained in low-level diplomacy to apply the Benson/PRODEM scalpel. Three specialties are required and all are found in the Special Operations Command: special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations (PSYOP).

Since Vietnam, Green Berets have participated in peacetime civic action projects. The 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups worked with Indian tribes in Florida, Arizona, and Montana to improve their living conditions and to build roads and medical facilities. Special Forces medics have given free medical care to low income groups in Hoke and Anson counties of North Carolina.<sup>13</sup> These types of programs have prepared Special Forces soldiers to perform similar duties in fighting the Drug War.

Special forces detachments serving as advisors on continuous, small scale operations could also help counterdrug forces provide security for farmers who opt for the new economic strategy. This puts the Cartel on the tactical defensive.<sup>14</sup>

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at Fort Bragg, N.C., is ideally suited to implement the program, having already conducted some liaison with the Benson Institute. By using the expertise of the Benson Institute, PRODEM, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assets, civil affairs can develop a program that could play a critical role in the Drug War. The Benson/PRODEM approach satisfies every agricultural criterion of the civil affairs feasibility matrix:<sup>15</sup> Does it conform to local customs? Are all necessary skills available? Are labor, materials, and equipment

available? Can it be supported by current programmed funds?

The third leg of this "targeting triad" is the 4th PSYOP Group. PSYOP can help turn the farmers toward the government by—

- Disseminating themes that encourage self-sustenance, health, and family stability versus working in the acid pits of the drug laboratories.

- Publicizing the previous successes of the Benson/PRODEM projects.

The effectiveness indicators would be the number of farmers who opted for the new economic technique and the amount of intelligence they provided against the traffickers.<sup>16</sup>

Peru and Bolivia have been very vocal in pushing the U.S. for crop "substitution" programs, but such programs don't meet middle or long term goals. The Prince of Thailand tried a specific agricultural alternative in the Golden Triangle during the 1970's. As a trained botanist, he convinced the farmers in the drug-contested area to grow orchids as a cash crop instead of the heroin poppy. He provided security forces and civil affairs and PSYOP teams until the program took hold. He was able to regain the support of the people in the region; but his program, and subsequent crop substitution programs sponsored by the UN in Thailand, met with mixed success.

Replacing drug crops with orchids, rice, coffee, or kidney beans didn't eliminate the need for farmers to barter for the basic necessities of a well balanced diet.<sup>17</sup> Neither did it reduce their dependence on a narrow range of export crops subject to foreign tariffs and world market fluctuations.<sup>18</sup>

## Viable Solutions

Using the combined strategies of the Benson Institute's Small Scale Agriculture and PRODEM's financial approach instead, these countries can achieve both short and long term goals. In the short term, the drug crop will shrink and the small farmer won't be economically dependent on the drug trafficker. In the long term, we'll see an improved quality of life for much of the Third World's population and the establishment of a sound economic and political base for these nations.

The military services already support the State Department's cultural exchange program involving U.S. and foreign military personnel. They also support USAID by administering military aspects of security assistance affecting civil-military action and by providing humanitarian

and civic assistance.<sup>19</sup>

By including the Benson Institute's program with the State Department's cultural exchange programs, the United States can offer a politically and financially feasible, effective economic alternative in the Drug War. At a time when Congress is looking for ways to do more with less, and when an increasing number of MI soldiers are filling counterdrugs positions, we need to search for answers like these—programs that are not only cost-effective, but also can prevent the need for greater U.S. involvement in the future.<sup>20</sup>

## End Notes

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12. COL Robert L. Howard, "A History of Special Forces," (a briefing paper written while the author [a Medal of Honor winner] was Commander, Special Operations Command-Korea).

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## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE in LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by Captain David B. Collins, U.S. Air Force

What is MI's role in Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC)? To answer this, we need to explore the shifting global factors that affect U.S. national priorities. These shifts will determine U.S. involvement in LIC and, in turn, what role MI will play.

While the term LIC is relatively new, the phenomenon it describes is not. In fact, since 1945 at least 85 "low-intensity" conflicts have been waged, at a cost of 20 to 30 million lives. But only recently, as a result of reduced superpower tensions, has our government placed a heightened emphasis on LIC. These shifting priorities carry with them significant changes for MI.

To help focus our shifting priorities, we use the Operational Continuum model. It encompasses three environments: Peacetime competition, conflict, and war. The four operational categories of LIC are counterinsurgency operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations. Usually, LIC's four operational categories fall into the peacetime competition and conflict environments. However, the combating terrorism mission can occur throughout the entire operational continuum.

Applying LIC to a scenario is valid only from the U.S. perspective. For those involved, the situation may be anything but "low intensity." LIC is not a series of events, but rather an environment which acts as a catalyst. Therefore, we shouldn't assess LIC developments by the events themselves, but rather by the character of the situation. Only then can we implement the proper resources to achieve our objectives.

Many things are happening that will ultimately change our nation's role in LIC. Dramatic political change is currently underway, from the

apparent evaporation of the Communist Bloc to recent advances toward democracy in Latin America. From the myriad of changes, one fact becomes crystal clear: We're not in a "business as usual" situation. What has yet to crystallize, though, is the full impact these events will have on the military. However, we do know—

- Defense spending is decreasing and budgets are austere.
- Military manpower levels are shrinking.
- New military roles and taskings are emerging (for example, counterdrugs).
- The political landscape in Eastern Europe is fundamentally altered.
- The probability of war with Warsaw Pact nations is greatly reduced.
- The Stalinist model is bankrupt.

Each of these will factor significantly into the future of U.S. military forces—how they're organized, resourced, and trained; and what types of operational missions they'll be given.

### New Tactics and Procedures

As the probability of general war decreases and regional or LIC threats increase, we'll need to develop war-fighting tactics and procedures different from the historical Central European scenario, which is the keystone of our conventional war-fighting (AirLand Battle) doctrine. These trends will have an impact on available resources; and resource constraints will continue to impact budget appropriations.

Our national security strategy is to secure national interests and objectives by tailoring all our resources to meet the threat. In support of this, our military strategy has had two fundamental tenets: Deterrence; and failing that, flexible response to defeat the threat.



We understand these tenets, which can be broken out as forward defense and coalition warfare, in the context of general or limited war. However, overlaying this understanding onto the LIC arena can be misleading. Substantially different functional realities cloud the issues in LIC. One key difference is the relative position of the military instrument to other instruments of national power in a general war versus LIC. In a general war, the military is the supported instrument; all other instruments of national power (economic, political, and informational) support the military. By contrast, in LIC, military forces are a supporting instrument, with the political element clearly taking the lead.

This relationship supports our shifting strategy emphasis in dealing with issues such as deterring regional conflicts or preventing escalation (as in a peacekeeping role). In each case, diplomatic efforts should precede the use of military force. Along with a shift of emphasis, comes a shift of focus to a wide range of LIC threats, such as narcotrafficking.

Soviet doctrine, as it relates to the Third World, has also changed. Out of these changes, new LIC trends have emerged. Under President Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviet military has taken a dual-track approach. The first track includes a policy of sustainment for existing relationships. By itself, this isn't unusual. Soviet dealings with the Third World have traditionally cycled between expansionism and consolidation efforts. However, the second track is a departure from the standard Soviet-Third World model. Moscow now seems to be coaxing client states toward peaceful rather than revolutionary solutions—even to the point of encouraging economic participation in the capitalist marketplace. The combined impact of these and other trends will have a profound effect on MI's role in LIC.

### LIC Factors

Many unique factors typify the LIC environment and help foster LIC situations. Traditional solutions, used to resolve similar problems outside the LIC environment, usually don't work in LIC, thus giving MI an increased role. For example, effective operations in LIC often depend on host nation support. However, the frequent lack of in-place, compatible communications assets can create operational problems. On a broader scale, system incompatibility between nations further limits capabilities. Therefore, in Third World LIC scenarios, unlike operations in NATO,

the ability of U.S. forces to enter an area and "plug into" a command, control, communications, and intelligence net is virtually nonexistent.

Good intelligence is critical, therefore, to successful operations. The political and economic frailty of many Third World nations provides a fertile environment for LIC. Within this environment, MI operations are a key factor in achieving LIC objectives. In fact, MI is the key discipline in monitoring potential LIC situations and providing early warning of potential threats.

One central characteristic of intelligence in LIC is that while it must respond to a wide variety of threats, it must do so with limited presence. For that reason, U.S. MI assets in LIC are communications intensive and rely heavily on remoting and relays.

Whenever possible, U.S. intelligence collection efforts should meld with those of the host nation. Such partnerships offer several advantages. First, they clearly demonstrate U.S. commitment through the use of intelligence assets as a low-visibility, non-lethal force multiplier. Second, host nation commanders see the value of tactical intelligence as well as the importance of interaction between intelligence and operations. Merging intelligence assets also strengthens bilateral military relations, and frequently shows positive spin-offs into strengthened political relations as well. Finally, it provides two-way educational opportunities for U.S. intelligence personnel: Instructing host nation personnel on U.S. systems gives our people the opportunity to learn and apply host nation ideas.

Intelligence operations in LIC, whether bilateral, multilateral, or U.S. only, are different from intelligence operations in limited or general war. In limited or general war, control and execution are decentralized to combat commanders. Dedicated intelligence collection systems respond to taskings in support of specific combat commanders. Organic intelligence resources deploy and operate with military forces. By contrast, LIC operations require centralized control with decentralized execution. In LIC, intelligence collection serves not only the combat commander, but also political and military decision makers.

In limited or general war, tactical intelligence supports the U.S. commander, with a secondary benefit to non-U.S. forces. The focus is on high technology systems. Operational emphasis is focused inward—on improving existing capabilities or developing new ones. By contrast, classic, high-technology systems are of limited use in

LIC, so they're rarely diverted from their continuing, traditional missions. Other intelligence assets must fill the bulk of LIC intelligence collection requirements. Additionally, tactical HUMINT has a key role in LIC.

Operations in the LIC arena require tactical intelligence assets to support the host nation, since true resolution of the problem is best achieved domestically, rather than being "imported." In LIC, the training emphasis is on improving host nation capabilities; training benefits to U.S. forces are sometimes secondary. U.S. and host nation military assets operate together as supporting agents for U.S. and host nation political efforts.

### Challenges

What, then, are the challenges generated by a changing world and shifting U.S. defense strategy emphasis? They are both numerous and significant. First, as LIC intelligence collection requirements increase, competition for limited resources increases. The consequence of only intermittent access to critical resources is that intelligence monitoring of LIC situations becomes reactive rather than predictive. This is further complicated by the fact that it's hard to predict many aspects of LIC. The "predictive window" is smaller than that found in conventional military conflicts. Also, because of centralized control of U.S. intelligence involvement in LIC, the information flow tends to get bogged down.

Second, our emphasis in developing intelligence collection systems favors high technology systems, which, as stated before, have limited use in LIC. Finally, we'll have an increasingly harder time identifying friend from foe (IFF) simply by the weapon systems used. This has long been the case with smaller, less sophisticated systems. However, as communist arms producers enlarge their niche in the commercial market, the use of visual IFF alone to identify weapons like aircraft and armor vehicles will not suffice.

As new intelligence collection systems are put into place, the older systems could be shifted for use in LIC; but, again, those systems often have limited value in LIC. As a result, a key collection resource in LIC is HUMINT. We need operationally oriented analysts, who have a focus on the LIC environment, to properly analyze data collected by other assets. To meet this requirement, we either must retrain analysts in-place and redirect their efforts or train new people.

We need to address these problems now, not

"down the road." In dealing with this fact, several realities come to light. A growing number of threat groups, particularly terrorist organizations, have sophisticated operations security capabilities including state-of-the-art communications equipment. It's also harder to target threat groups as they diversify, merge, develop front organizations, etc. Tracking relationships between groups, operational areas, and funding sources is increasingly complex. Finally, improperly trained analysts can not only invalidate the collection effort but also may place HUMINT sources at risk or provide erroneous data to senior decision makers.

### In Summary

The shifting of U.S. national strategy emphasis in response to changing global realities, translates into force reductions and restructuring of the U.S. military. However, MI is the key to success in LIC, regardless of the nature of the conflict. MI provides the analysis of the shape and scope of the battlefield—a critical element in any LIC engagement. The conceptual framework for such engagements is found in the LIC imperatives:

- Primacy of the political instrument of national power.
- Discriminate use of force.
- Unity of effort.
- Perseverance.
- Adaptability.
- Legitimacy of effort.

Success in LIC depends on a clear understanding of the differences between the application of MI assets and their key functions and relative value in a limited or general war as opposed to in LIC. The challenge is to develop intelligence strategies and applications to enhance predictive rather than reactive involvement in LIC; and to come up with solutions that fall within the guidance of U.S. national strategy as a coordinated tool of national policy.

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# UNDERSTANDING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

By Captain Daniel L. Thomas

The Iraqi attempt to link the invasion of Kuwait to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip focused new attention on the Palestinian problem. The Gulf crisis also added fuel to the Palestinian uprising, known as the Intifada, which continues into its fourth year. As these events show, the Palestinian problem isn't going to go away—instead, it continues to surface to the forefront of world attention.

To understand the Palestinian problem, we need to understand the interrelated conflicts that involve Palestinians in one way or another. The Palestinian resistance is complicated and confusing, and even experts fail to grasp the movement's intricacies. For example, the Rowland Evans and Robert Novak newspaper column of January 9, 1991, stated that "Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization" opposed Abu Abbas' "rejectionist" organization.<sup>1</sup> However, Abbas' group, the Palestine Liberation Front, is actually a member of the PLO and holds a cabinet level seat in that organization.

Countries or organizations often try to manipulate such inaccuracies. In 1982, the Israeli government searched for an excuse to attack PLO positions in Southern Lebanon. Knowing this, the PLO ordered its forces to refrain from hostile activity so they wouldn't provoke an attack. Then, on June 3, 1982, the Al Fatah Uprising, a splinter group outside of and opposed to the PLO, attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to London. Israel used this incident to justify an attack on the PLO.<sup>2</sup> Although their invasion of Lebanon was prompted by a non-PLO group, the Israelis took advantage of the public's lack of knowledge concerning the Palestinian problem.

## Palestinian Resistance Groups

One element commonly misunderstood when the Palestinian resistance is discussed is the fact that the movement is composed of multiple resistance groups. Many think the Palestinian resistance is simply embodied within a single entity, the PLO. Instead, the PLO is made up of numerous Palestinian resistance organizations with a wide variety of objectives. There are also a num-



ber of Palestinian resistance organizations outside the PLO.

Each of these organizations has its own unique history, membership, support, organization, and doctrine. The assorted Palestinian groups align, splinter, break alignments, and realign frequently. They also have a difficult time agreeing with each other on almost any issue. To say the "Palestinians" are for something is misleading. We need to specify which group holds which position, even when talking about the PLO in general.

The characteristics and behavior of the various Palestinian factions contribute to the confusion about Palestinian affairs. Almost every organization has a military arm, including those within the PLO. These groups often conduct their own military operations independent of, and often in opposition to, the interests of the other groups. In fact, groups sometimes conduct terrorist operations against each other. For example, in 1984, the group Sa'iqa is believed to have killed a Yasir Arafat supporter in Nicosia, Cyprus; and, in 1983, the Al Fatah Revolutionary Council assassinated a PLO official.<sup>3</sup> Knowing that the Palestinian resistance is made up of multiple competing groups is the first step toward understanding the problem.

sinated a PLO official.<sup>3</sup> Knowing that the Palestinian resistance is made up of multiple competing groups is the first step toward understanding the problem.

## PLO Structure

Knowing the PLO's structure is the second step toward understanding the Palestinian problem. The PLO is the most important Palestinian organization. It's the closest thing to a front group that unifies the splintered elements of the resistance, and most Palestinian Arabs view the PLO as their only legitimate representative.

Surprisingly, the PLO's political structure resembles a parliamentary government, consisting of three separate parts: The Palestinian National Council (PNC), which serves as its legislative body; the Central Council, which serves a joint legislative and executive function; and the Executive Committee, which is the PLO's cabinet level executive body. Figure 1 shows the PLO structure and the various groups the PNC represents.

The Palestinian National Council. The




Figure 1. PLO Organization

Computer Graphics:  
Kazuko Klever



PNC normally meets every year or during emergencies and special occasions. When in session, it reviews Executive Committee reports on the achievements and status of the PLO, its institutions, and budget, and considers policy recommendations. The PNC has 500 seats divided among three categories of representation: Resistance organizations; mass unions and syndicates; and Palestinian communities outside Palestine.<sup>4</sup>

The resistance organizations have changed over the years; but today, they are Al Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).<sup>5</sup> Each group is allocated a number of seats equivalent to its strength. Al Fatah controls about one third of the seats while the rest of the groups divide the remainder.

The mass unions and syndicates are associations that resemble trade unions. There are 10 of these associations, representing professionals, workers, students, women, artists, and peasant groups.<sup>6</sup> Wherever a group of Palestinians lives in the world, it forms national associations that become chapters of these international unions. The group elects its representatives to the union leadership, who, in turn, elect representatives to attend the PNC.<sup>7</sup>

Palestinian communities are geographical groupings of Palestinians in countries such as Jordan, Egypt, United States, and Syria. The PLO invites prominent members of these communities, such as health and education department heads, to represent their local populace. The PLO also allocates a large block of seats to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the 18th meeting of the PNC in 1988, 186 seats were reserved for delegates invited from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (who were subsequently blocked from attendance by Israel).<sup>8</sup>

Through the PNC, the PLO has "provided a wide range of Palestinian groups from various sections of the community the opportunity to participate in the decision making process."<sup>9</sup> In return, these groups allow the PLO leadership to "reach parts of the community not otherwise directly accessible."<sup>10</sup>

**The Central Council.** Because the PNC's representatives are scattered all over the globe, it's difficult for them to meet frequently. The Central Council meets every third month and conducts necessary business during the PNC's

recess.<sup>11</sup> It has 90 representatives, and its membership also duplicates the division of power between the various PNC groups.<sup>12</sup>

**The Executive Committee.** The Executive Committee is in permanent session and runs day-to-day PLO operations. It has 15 members whose selection is approved by the PNC.<sup>13</sup> They not only manage the diplomatic and military affairs of the PLO, but they also oversee a large bureaucracy that collects taxes, runs factories, administers hospitals, and directs social welfare organizations that deliver services to Palestinians worldwide.

Members of the Executive Committee are leaders of each respective commando organization and various independents from the unions and territories.<sup>14</sup> They're chosen to represent their portion of membership in the overall organization. Each member fills a position similar to a minister on a parliamentary cabinet with a portfolio, such as the political department (the PLO's foreign ministry), the health department, or the department of education and cultural affairs.<sup>15</sup>

The Executive Committee leader, formerly known as the chairman, now has the title of president of Palestine, and is the leader of the PLO. The Central Committee elected Arafat to this post on April 3, 1989. The chairman or president has historically been a member of Al Fatah, the largest resistance group. The structure and operation of the Executive Committee resemble the cabinet of a typical coalition government.

### **PLO Social Service Bureaucracy**

The PLO provides many services to Palestinians through an extensive bureaucracy. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that the PLO is their legitimate representative. The PLO does what most modern governments do: They try to gain the people's support by providing services.

PLO bureaucracy permeates every aspect of Palestinian life including sports, theater and arts, economics, radio and television, cinema, child care, welfare, and veterans' benefits. In effect, the PLO has, for years, administered the equivalent of a federal bureaucracy. For example, the PLO's health department offers a complete system of health care to refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and other Middle East countries.

### **Political Decision Making**

Al Fatah is the largest resistance group and controls the majority of the PLO. However, the leadership tries to reach a consensus between all groups on final decisions. The Executive Commit-

tee tries to arrive at compromise solutions acceptable to all members of the Palestinian community. They usually debate and agree on measures in the Executive Committee and then send them to the PNC where they're easily approved. If the Executive Committee can't agree, the measure is then contested in the PNC.

This was the case in 1987 when the PLO considered accepting U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the willingness to accept Israel's right to exist and the renunciation of terrorism. They debated these propositions during 600 hours of talks over a 3-month period. Finally, they were forced to a vote in the PNC: 243 in favor and 46 opposed with 10 abstentions.<sup>16</sup> Yet, even after achieving this victory, Arafat moved to moderate the decision by "accepting the right of all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries,"<sup>17</sup> without mentioning Israel specifically. He did this because the minority vehemently opposed the decision and because he wanted, above all, to maintain a consensus. The PLO hesitates taking a stand that will result in a division of its ranks because its members might leave the organization in protest. As a result, PLO policies are sometimes irresolute and their rhetoric contradictory.

## Conclusion

Full understanding of Middle East affairs requires an understanding of the Palestinian problem, which demands an understanding of the resistance organization. The Palestinian resistance consists of numerous guerrilla groups and political organizations that, at any give time, align, compete, and oppose one another. Even the PLO's internal affairs are confusing. This is why

the Palestinian problem itself is so difficult to follow. Learning the basics behind the Palestinian resistance organizations is one step toward gaining the knowledge necessary to decipher the deeper problems of the region.

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Captain Daniel L. Thomas is a combat targeting officer for Joint Intelligence Center Pacific and is a foreign area officer selectee for the Middle East. He graduated from Colorado State University, Phi Beta Kappa, with a major in political science. He was distinguished graduate in the Defense Intelligence College where he earned a Master's degree in Strategic Intelligence. He has served as a ground surveillance radar platoon leader and a battalion S2.

Military Intelligence



By Captain George Santiago

Since the end of World War II, we Americans have had a difficult time defining peace. Many define it as the absence of war. Others say peace is the absence of a declaration of war. Nonetheless, during the last 46 years of "peace," American soldiers have fought in numerous conflicts. The lack of a formal declaration of war has often meant our troops have gone into battle unprepared and without the material, intelligence, and popular support needed to win. Today's realities demand that we break away from the old black and white definitions of war and peace, and look at the world through what's known as the Operational Continuum: Peacetime competition, conflict, and war.

### The New Threat

During the height of the Cold War, Americans believed the real threat to world peace was communism. Yet, as the Soviet Empire unravels, we catch glimpses of unrest in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and even in Eastern Europe. Perhaps, the real threat was never communism itself, but rather poverty, underdevelopment, and social injustice: Three essential ingredients for unrest. As the world changes in terms of popula-

tion growth, arms proliferation, and the emergence of regional powers, it's clear that competition for limited resources will grow. The recent war with Iraq shows that peaceful competition for dwindling resources can quickly escalate into conflict and war.

The Operational Continuum can help us plan our political and military response to present and future threats. It's essential that intelligence professionals understand the Operational Continuum if we are to successfully support its entire range of military operations.

### The Operational Continuum

The Operational Continuum is a dynamic spectrum consisting of three environments: Peacetime competition, conflict, and war. (Figure 1 shows this in graphic form.) Within this Continuum, the United States could find itself in peacetime competition with one nation and at war with another nation, while in conflict with still another nation, all at the same time. Moreover, recent peacetime contingency missions such as JUST CAUSE and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM reveal the Operational Continuum isn't a one way street, but rather a multi-path avenue which permits operations to flow in all directions. This is a key point of the Opera-

tional Continuum: Operations don't end after the cessation of hostilities just as they don't begin with the firing of the first shot.

Figure 2 illustrates how Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM flowed along the Operational Continuum. Beginning from left, the United States and Iraq were engaged in peacetime competition since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The United States had hoped to influence Baghdad to pull out of the Soviet sphere. But in July of 1990, Iraq massed troops on the Kuwaiti

border and threatened to invade if Kuwait didn't cut its oil production. The U.S. response was mainly diplomatic. However, we held joint air defense exercises with our Persian Gulf allies. These activities brought us to the brink of entering a conflict environment on the Operational Continuum. When Iraq appeared to back off, it looked as though the situation would remain in a peacetime competition environment.

However, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, with the onset of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the




Figure1. Operational Continuum




Figure 2. Example of Operational Continuum for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Computer Graphic  
Kazuko Klever



United States and Iraq entered the conflict environment. Had DESERT SHIELD succeeded in convincing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, we wouldn't have had to move into the next environment on the Continuum—war. However, when months of diplomatic and military maneuvering failed, the United States and its allies initiated Operation DESERT STORM. At this point, we crossed over into the war environment. Initially, the allies limited their actions to aerial bombing, hoping to persuade Iraq to withdraw. Again, Iraq's failure to withdraw forced the allies to move deeper into the war environment on the Continuum and to initiate ground operations.

After the ground war, the allies halted offensive operations but maintained forces inside Iraq—thus moving back into a conflict environment on the Continuum. Within the conflict environment, the Kurdish refugee situation in northern Iraq caused the United States to initiate Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and GAL-LANT PROVIDER.

The final chapter in the war with Iraq remains incomplete at this time. The allied goal is to work back through the Operational Continuum while rebuilding Kuwait and to reestablish a peacetime competition environment. It's up to Iraq whether or not that happens, and the potential exists for us to shift backwards through conflict and war again before achieving peacetime competition.

### Implications for the IEW System

Today's political and military realities require the IEW system remain alert and focused on potential trouble spots. We not only must be prepared for war but we also must be prepared to support operations after the war ends and during peacetime competition. In Panama, timely and accurate intelligence enabled U.S. forces to achieve all our mission objectives within a relatively short time. While good intelligence resulted in a quick end to the fighting, gaps in intelligence support to posthostilities operations (such as population resource control, military government) slowed the transition from combat to nation building.

In Iraq, superb intelligence support resulted in an overwhelming victory over the Iraqi armed forces. Intelligence also played a key role in dealing with the Shi'ite Moslems in occupied southern Iraq. However, in northern Iraq, the United States had to play catch-up in determining the direction of the Kurdish insurgency and in recon-

noitering suitable refugee camp sites only days before the camps were to be established.

History tells us that the United States can fight and win wars, and that the intelligence community does an excellent job of supporting combat operations. However, future challenges will not always be well defined, and our potential adversaries may not always carry weapons. Natural disasters, famines, epidemics, and poverty may require U.S. military assistance. Moreover, the growing rift between the world's "haves" and "have nots" will continue to fuel insurgencies.

The IEW system must identify potential threats. This information will be the basis on which our decision makers can establish a proactive foreign policy. It will also be the justification for maintaining a balanced and flexible military force, ready whenever we need it. While the Operational Continuum doesn't offer solutions, it is a yardstick that allows us to put world developments into context. The IEW system must maintain the capability to scan for future threats throughout the whole range of the Operational Continuum. In this way, we can ensure our armed forces are manned in the right numbers and armed with the right weapons to meet the challenges of the near and distant future.

To support operations across the Operational Continuum, the Intelligence Center is writing doctrine that will bridge the gap that exists in this area. FM 34-36, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare and Army Special Forces Operations, is in its final production stages and should be published by the end of this calendar year. The Intelligence Center and the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) community worked closely to produce this manual, which discusses ARSOF and IEW missions and interrelationships across the Operational Continuum. The Intelligence Center is also producing FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict, which is scheduled for publication the third quarter FY 92. For more information, call me or CW3 Gary Fulton at AV 821-3355.

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# Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Battalion Command Sergeant Major

By Colonel Robert B. Mangold  
and Command Sergeant Major  
James A. (Art) Johnson

Regardless of our rank or at what echelon we serve, sooner or later the subject comes up: What are the duties, responsibilities, and authority of the battalion command sergeant major? Many of us tried to answer this question at some point in our careers; while a student, at the club, or in the field where the issue sometimes takes on a perspective unlike the garrison environment. After much honest discussion, we, as two old soldiers, want to lay out in uncluttered language what we perceive the answer to be. First, we'll deal with generic elements of what a CSM should be, and then we'll focus on his or her specific role in the MI battalion.

Overarching the generic and specific roles of a battalion CSM is a concept so fundamental it bears mentioning up front. Whether CSMs have MI or combat arms backgrounds, their experience and knowledge of the Army and military operations, specifically combat operations, enable them to support their commander's execution of the combat mission in a manner they and the unit commanders mutually agree upon. The key is the mutual agreement on the CSM's specific duties, responsibilities, and authority. This understanding must be established within the first several days of a new commander's or command sergeant major's arrival at the unit.

In every battalion, regardless of branch, CSMs represent the commander to the troops and the troops to the commander. While the first priority of CSMs is mission accomplishment, they always look out for their soldiers' professional and personal welfare. CSMs must keep watch over the entire unit and provide feedback to commanders. They advise the commander on what's being done right and what's being done wrong. The CSM is

the primary set of eyes and ears for the commander, a problem solver, and an available resource to every soldier and officer in the battalion. CSMs don't sit in the TOC and should not sit in the back of commanders' vehicles (along for the ride); they should have their own vehicles with ample communications to accomplish the wide range of tasks for which they're responsible.

The duties, responsibilities, and authority of the MI battalion CSM are driven by his or her relationship with the commander and the Intelligence Cycle.


The cycle consists of four phases: Directing, collecting, processing, and disseminating/using. It's a continuous process, and even though each phase is conducted in sequence, all phases are conducted concurrently. While new information is being collected, the staff plans and redirects efforts to meet new demands, and previously collected information is processed and disseminated. All phases of the cycle focus on the mission.

MI battalion CSMs must be involved in the totality of the Intelligence Cycle. Primarily, they operate within the outer ring—planning and supervising. Again, this role is based on a shared understanding of the mission, supplemented by

the commander's intent. After the commander, the CSM's experience and background make him or her the best qualified, educated, and trained member of the battalion to perform this vital function.

The MI battalion commander, however, must expand the CSM's duties, responsibilities, and authority beyond planning and supervising. To capitalize on the CSM's experience and abilities, the commander has to give him or her the latitude to move about the unit to examine the directing, collecting, processing, and disseminating/using functional parts of the battalion. The CSM must be allowed to make suggestions and question those actions that don't adhere to the commander's intent or in some other way don't contribute to mission accomplishment. CSMs don't have the authority to tell company commanders what to do, but they must be able to ask why certain events are taking place to ensure what is being done supports the battalion commander's intent for accomplishing the mission.

With just a few words, we have attempted to deal with a weighty issue. Our success depends on our readers' abilities to likewise come to grips with the issues in their own units.



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**rumor** 'rʊmə(r) *n* -s see -or in *Explan Notes* ME *rumour*, fr. MF, fr. L *rumor*; akin to OE *rēon* to lament, MHG *rienen* to moan, complain, ON *rymja* to roar, grumble, *rymr* coarse voice, L *ravus* hoarse, *ravis* hoarseness, Gk *ōryesthai* to howl, roar, Skt *rauti* he roars, cries 1 **a** : common talk or opinion : widely disseminated belief having no discernible foundation or source : HEARSAY (< ~ puts the amount at about 5000 kegs —W.Z.Rip> <we make our blunders . . . as ~ has it that you make your own — N.Cardoz>) **b** : an instance of rumor : a statement or report current without any known authority for its truth <almost every newspaper issue brought ~s of reduction in their salaries —V.G.Heiser>; *esp* : an unconfirmed piece of information or explanation disseminated among the public by other than formal news agencies or sources <one of the community's most creative gossips begins to circulate the ~ that she is either a spy or a saboteur —Charles Lee> <tips and ~s . . . would send shares . . . up to thousands, and down again to the gutter —*Amer. Guide Series: Nev.*> **c** *archaic* : talk or report of a notable person or event : FAME <great is the ~ of this dreadful knight and his achievements of no less account —Shak.> 2 **a** *archaic* : a prolonged in-

# RUMORS

by Captain Stuart Wahlers

**A** rumor is widely disseminated talk or opinion that has no discernible source. It satisfies mutual needs and predispositions created or enhanced by important, yet ambiguous situations or events. Rumors can relieve tensions, justify feelings, and explain events.<sup>1</sup>

When properly planned, executed, and monitored, rumors can be used to influence attitudes, opinions, and behavior of target audiences throughout the world. The rumor is also a psychological operations (PSYOP) tool the commander and staff can use to favorably influence the course of battle.

Rumors affect the attitudes, opinions, and decisions of our nation's leaders and financiers, as well as the public. Recently, rumors seriously affected financial investors' decisions concerning

Savings and Loan Associations. During the early 1980's, exaggerated fear rumors concerning the poisoning of a headache remedy created panic among consumers and investors alike. The poisonings and subsequent rumors caused investors to withdraw their support from the product's company. Related poisonings of other products and the continued rumors generated by a panicky public forced the federal government and the food industry to create an entirely new "tamper proof" food packaging industry, costing consumers and investors millions of dollars.

During the recent Persian Gulf Crisis, rumors were rampant. They influenced decisions that impacted the entire world. Rumors sprung up about Iraqi use of NBC munitions;<sup>2</sup> the purpose and effectiveness of military actions in the region; the size, composition, and level of preparedness of military forces involved in the conflict; and the worldwide price of oil. Allegations of investment firms using rumors to influence oil



prices on U.S. markets prompted our government to investigate those investment firms.<sup>3</sup>

Were all these rumors purposefully disseminated? Were they generated spontaneously due to a lack of solid information? Did they explain ambiguous situations? Did the target audiences get psychological relief from the rumors? Whatever the reason, these rumors got psychological results. They affected the attitudes, opinions, and actions of soldiers, citizens, and leaders worldwide—precisely PSYOP's desired effect.

### Careful Planning

Like any other weapon, PSYOP must be carefully planned, timed, monitored, and adjusted during all battle phases to ensure maximum effectiveness. Rumors alone can't change the course of battle; they must be integrated carefully with other systems in the commander's inventory.

To develop and disseminate a PSYOP rumor—

• Know the national and PSYOP objectives.<sup>4</sup> The commander's mission and concept of the operation must mesh with these.

• Have up-to-date intelligence concerning the target audience in the commander's area of interest.

• Know the target audience's culture, religion, history, living conditions, and psychological vulnerabilities and predispositions.

• Make sure your plan supports specific psychological objectives.

• Choose the types of rumors you want to use.

• Select the media to introduce and disseminate the rumors.

The rumors must be believable and consistent with the current mood of the target audience. Ultimately, they must change people's attitudes and behaviors in a way that's consistent with the supported commander's objectives.

### Historical Usage

The detailed military planning of rumor campaigns isn't new. The Mongols, during their quest for world domination, consistently incorporated rumor campaigns into all their field operations. Using these tactics, they were able to gain advantages against numerically superior forces while waging wars far from their Mongolian homeland.<sup>5</sup>

The Mongols often sealed the fate of their enemy before the first arrow was flung. They were assured of victory because they knew their enemy. Their intelligence network gathered as much information about the enemy as possible, analyzed it, and incorporated the results into their tactical and psychological planning.

Serfs in the targeted areas would hear rumors that the Mongols would free them, while the rich were told the Mongols would pay them for their cooperation. Sometimes, the rumors would exaggerate the size of the Mongol forces or advertise their cruelty against stubborn defenders. By planting the idea of Mongol superiority in the target audience's minds, they gained a quick surrender from an already psychologically defeated army.<sup>6</sup>

During Batu Khan's invasion of Russia, his rumor mongers carried the opposite message. Before the invasion, they spread the story that the Mongols were far from their homeland and weak, had settled down for the brutal Russian winter, and were ill-prepared to wage siege warfare against barricaded Russian cities. The Russians, warm and secure in their cities, believed these rumors, thinking that no sane commander

***"The Mongols often sealed the fate of their enemy before the first arrow was flung. They were assured of victory because they knew their enemy."***



Illustration:  
SPC Richard Hickson

would attempt offensive operations into Russia in the winter. The Mongols, tempered to withstand extreme hardships, crossed the Volga River in the winter of 1237, marched hundreds of miles, overcame the walled city of Ryazan, defeated the Muscovites, and defeated the fortified city of Vladimir.<sup>7</sup>

Batu Khan integrated all his weapon systems into his battlefield operations. He used a series of PSYOP and tactical maneuvers, including rumor campaigns, feints, ruses, terrorist actions, and flanking maneuvers. The Mongols consistently outmaneuvered numerically superior adversaries on their own soil. They eventually subjugated most of the people living between Poland and Korea to their rule.<sup>8</sup>

Today, as in the past, rumors are a PSYOP tool that can help commanders attain their goals. Once you decide to use rumors (based on target analysis and careful planning), remember three essential elements:

- The rumor must be credible.
- The source must be believable to the target audience, be empathetic to their needs, and speak their dialect.
- The selection of believable receivers and repeaters is essential.

Due to the way they're transmitted, rumors are one of the more difficult PSYOP tools to control. Yet, if effectively planned, monitored, and adjusted, they can pay off handsomely. As soon as the rumor reaches the target audience, it passes through several distinct stages:

- The receiver "levels" or tailors the details of the rumor, keeping the personally significant elements.
- Those details that aren't leveled out become more important. This is known as sharpening. People tend to fixate on details important to them; for example, an engineer will sharpen details about engineering and a truck driver will sharpen details about driving a truck.
- The story will be assimilated. The receivers and repeaters will adjust the story to fit their personality, habits, and interests. Assimilation is based on a person's emotions, ethnocentricisms, and prejudices.<sup>9</sup>


Recently, the *Stars and Stripes* newspaper in Europe featured several letters from irate adults who had witnessed the rowdy behavior of American students on spring break in Spain. The letters described the students' loud and drunken behavior in detail, expressing shock and disdain. The letter writers deplored the "ugly American"

image presented by the teenagers. Further, the writers relayed that two students had been hospitalized for drug overdoses or had died after attempting to leap from a hotel balcony into a pool. After contacting the Spanish police and the American Embassy, the *Stars and Stripes* editors found that no American students had died or been hospitalized during the time mentioned in the letters.<sup>10</sup> This is an excellent example of a rumor being leveled, sharpened, and assimilated by a target audience.

Understand that leveling, sharpening, and assimilating can easily distort the original message. This process significantly alters the rumor as it passes through various sectors of the populace. Therefore, rumor campaigns must be constantly monitored for message content progress, and, if necessary, be reintroduced using radio, TV, or newsprint. This, of course, depends on the target audience and the availability of media to convey the original message.

Rumors come in various forms: Hate, fear, hope, and diving or recurring rumors. Hate rumors exploit prejudices within a target audience. Joseph Goebbels effectively used hate rumors to solidify ethnic German public support against ethnic and religious minority groups.<sup>11</sup> Although proven completely untrue, hate rumors spread among blacks and whites in Detroit in 1943 caused widespread, devastating civil disturbances.<sup>12</sup> In Mississippi in 1931, the combination of hate and fear rumors about the alleged rape of two white girls by several black men near Scottsboro resulted in the arrest and trial of the "Scottsboro Boys." The existing prejudice against Blacks made it easy for people to believe these hate rumors. The slipshod trial that followed eventually resulted in a Supreme Court decision concerning defendant rights and helped shape future American court decisions.<sup>13</sup>

Fear rumors are effective against target audiences willing to believe the worst is about to happen. The Mongols often used fear rumors to intimidate an enemy they were about to invade, and then reinforced the rumors by saying they were God's "chosen people." The German propaganda ministry used another form of fear rumor on its own people as World War II drew to a close. The ministry told its citizens and soldiers the Russian and American invaders would commit heinous atrocities if the Germans were defeated. Hitler's emissaries hoped this type of rumor would galvanize the Germans to fight to the death.<sup>14</sup>



***"Rumors about atrocities committed by Sherman's troops against Southern women and property caused many Confederate soldiers to desert and return home."***

During the waning days of the American Civil War, Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas generated numerous fear rumors which directly influenced political, military, and economic decisions. The British had been supplying munitions to the Southerners. But, they reconsidered their business agreements with the South when they heard rumors that the Confederacy's economy was in shambles and British supplies captured by Sherman's troops would be confiscated.<sup>15</sup> Rumors about atrocities committed by Sherman's troops against Southern women and property caused many Confederate soldiers to desert and return home. Fear rumors spread by Southern civilians facing Sherman's troops fostered a spirit of noncooperation between Southerners and the Union forces.<sup>16</sup>

Many times, fear rumors will generate hope rumors. Hope rumors flourish because people want things to get better, even though they may believe the worst. During World War II, the Germans, despite suffering terrible losses and being outnumbered, continued to produce war material

and to fight. They were sustained by hope rumors about a "wonder weapon" that would supposedly turn the tide of war in their favor.

Another type of rumor is the diving or recurring rumor. This rumor appears in relation to similar situations and circumstances. An example of this involves the "tongue and stamp" rumor. A prisoner of war sends his family a letter. The letter doesn't contain any unusual information except a request to save the stamp on the envelope. The family is surprised by this because the writer had never been a stamp collector. They remove the stamp and discover writing on the envelope underneath. The writer says the enemy had cut off his tongue.

This rumor surfaced in America during three wars, only the captors were different. It was widely circulated during each war despite obvious faults in logic. First, POW letters don't require stamps. Second, a prisoner without a tongue has trouble licking a stamp. Third, a person requires immediate and expert surgery, normally not available to POWs, when his tongue is removed, or he will bleed to death.<sup>17</sup>

During the Huk War, Philippine government forces faced the problem of removing Huk guerrillas entrenched on a hilltop near a village. The local troops had been unsuccessful, until a combat PSYOP squad was called in. After conducting a target analysis of the situation and the local populace, the squad determined that the local villagers and the guerrillas were extremely superstitious. They believed that vampires (or *asuangs*) haunted the area.

The squad circulated a rumor among the villagers that an *asuang* lived on the same hill as the Huk guerrillas. After allowing the rumor time to circulate, the squad prepared an ambush along a trail used by the guerrillas. One evening, after allowing a Huk patrol to travel through the ambush site, they silently snatched the last Huk in the patrol. The unfortunate man was killed. Two holes were punched into his neck to simulate a vampire's bite (visual reinforcement), and his body was drained of blood and placed back on the trail. The Huks later found their comrade's bloodless body, the obvious victim of an *asuang* attack. Due to the deliberately planted rumor, the Huk's belief in vampires, and the visual reinforcement (the Huk's body), the Huks vacated the hilltop without firing another shot, rather than risk confrontation with another *asuang*.

Another example of a diving or recurring rumor is one that persisted at the strategic level



concerning the origin and intent of the AIDS virus. The rumor's intent was to discredit the U.S. government worldwide. The general content of the rumor was that the U.S. government during the late 1960's and early 70's developed the AIDS virus in order to kill homosexuals, blacks, and intravenous drug users. Furthermore, the rumor said, U.S. convicts were inoculated with the AIDS virus which then spread into the general prison populace, and from the prisoners to the public.

Containing seemingly accurate historical events (on the surface), this rumor was well fabricated. It was well timed and got a lot of attention, due to AIDS coverage by credible media, initial conflicting scientific information, and an already fearful public. Furthermore, prominent East German scientists gave the rumor credibility by disseminating it among their Third World colleagues.<sup>18</sup> The rumor reappeared worldwide during the 1980's.<sup>19</sup> It has caused distrust and fear of U.S.-sponsored programs in many regions of the world.

***"...a fear rumor circulated simultaneously among the Cuban detainees at both facilities, causing them to believe they were going to be sent back to Cuba."***



## Rumor Control

Rumors, like any PSYOP weapon, can influence close, deep, and rear operations and can affect hostile, neutral, and friendly target audiences. Commanders must assume the enemy also will use them to influence friendly operations involving refugees, local inhabitants, and enemy prisoners.

During President Carter's administration, thousands of Cubans fled to the United States, seeking refuge from the Castro regime. Unfortunately, mixed into this group of legitimate refugees were some of Cuba's most violent criminals and psychiatric patients. Some of these were segregated at Atlanta's Federal Penitentiary and at Oakdale (Louisiana) Correctional Facility. Somehow, a fear rumor circulated simultaneously among the Cuban detainees at both facilities, causing them to believe they were going to be sent back to Cuba. Fearing expulsion, they rioted and seized control of both facilities, resulting in a lengthy hostage situation and massive damage at both facilities.<sup>20</sup> Were a similar situation to occur in POW holding areas, imagine the resources that would be expended to handle the situation. Maneuver commanders, POW facility commanders, and PSYOP planners must monitor and quell rumors affecting this important rear area operation.

It's equally important to monitor adverse rumors about refugees and civilians living in the rear area, since refugees are extremely susceptible to rumors. A commander's valuable assets can be quickly siphoned away from the close operations area to quell unrest in the rear area. Conversely, commanders planning deep operations into the enemy's rear area should plan rumor campaigns to disrupt the enemy's ability to concentrate forces in the close battle area. Whatever the objectives, rumors can help influence neutral target audiences to support U.S. objectives or to remain neutral.

Finally, the commanders must continually monitor rumors circulating among their own soldiers. Recent operations in St. Croix, Panama, and Saudi Arabia prove that our soldiers (and their dependents) are vulnerable to rumors. Leaders and staff sections at all levels must monitor and report rumors circulating within the command. The commander's PSYOP officer (if available), the operations officer, or the intelligence officer should monitor and evaluate rumors, using the SCAME formula: Source, content, audience, media, effect.<sup>21</sup> These officers



should—

- Locate the rumor's source.
- Determine its content.
- List the target audience (intended and unintended).
- Discover the media used to spread the rumor.
- Measure its effect on the target audience.

Once commanders have all the facts, they and their staffs must determine which course of action, if any, to take to minimize the rumor's effect. Before taking action, commanders must have current and accurate information. They must conduct a thorough target analysis by considering ongoing campaigns, available resources, and possible unwanted publicity (sometimes an impact indicator for the enemy) generated by a counterpropaganda campaign.

Most importantly, commanders must develop a rumor conscious attitude. They must educate their soldiers on the negative impact rumor campaigns have on operations, morale, and safety. The commander should encourage soldiers to report rumors instead of repeating them to others. Finally, the commander must keep soldiers informed, so they don't become unwitting dupes in the rumor perpetuation cycle.

In countering adverse rumor campaigns, commanders have several options:

- Directly refute the rumor. They should do this only when they can prove the rumor is false.
- Introduce new, relevant themes which refute the original themes through implication.
- Divert the target audience's attention away from the rumor by introducing new themes or by intensifying those themes that have proven effective in the past. (The Iranian Mullahs repeatedly used this technique on their own people in the 1980's.)
- Maintain silence. This technique implies that the rumor is so absurd it doesn't warrant a response.
- Censor information given to the soldiers. This is rarely used, because it creates tension and mistrust and often lends legitimacy to the enemy's propaganda.
- Alter the message slightly to support the commander's objectives.<sup>23</sup>

Rumors, like all PSYOP tools, influence attitude, opinion, and behavior at all levels. Consider using them when planning all operations, since few of us are completely immune to the effects of rumors. When properly planned and employed, rumors have repeatedly proven effective in

attaining goals and objectives at all levels of war.

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# OPERATION JUST CAUSE:

The Divisional MI Battalion,  
The Nonlinear Battlefield,  
and AirLand Operations-Future

*Farewell, the plumed troop,  
and the big wars,  
That make ambition virtue!"*

*Shakespeare's Othello  
Act 3, Scene 3*

By Major Victor M. Rosello

The Army is shifting its doctrinal focus from a European linear battlefield orientation to a global combination of both linear and nonlinear confrontation, to include contingency operations. However, Operation DESERT STORM reinforces the fact that the Army's view of future conflict can't totally disregard any of the various levels of conflict.

Before DESERT SHIELD, Army involvement in contingency operations fell into the broad category of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). LIC involves operations at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. LIC operations don't follow a standard pattern; the only constants are that they vary in character and involve the population. Although it's difficult to establish doctrine applicable to all LIC operations, the Army has attempted to do

this in **FM 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict**. Nevertheless, gray areas remain, and we need to face the difficult task of closing this gap of understanding.

The shift in focus has a major impact on the Army's tactical MI organization in airborne and light contingency forces. By studying the 82d Airborne Division's operations during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, we can better understand this impact. Although some experts dismiss this campaign as an anomaly rather than a representation of future warfare, I believe certain aspects can give us insights into the nature of nonlinear conflicts and the new role of MI. This article is neither a validation of current MI doctrine nor a lessons learned analysis. Even though our division successfully completed its JUST CAUSE mission in less than 30 days, I believe the operation uncovered serious flaws in the organization of divisional MI battalions. Hopefully, this discussion will stimulate thought.

### How We Organized

Our MI battalion provided intelligence support to the division by sending three equally divided company teams to each of the division's three infantry brigades/brigade task forces. On each company team, we sent three CI/IPW soldiers and four EW/SIGINT voice intercept operators per battalion task force in each brigade. Two EW/SIGINT analysts supported the transcription and analysis (TA) cell located with the brigade command post (CP). The HUMINT/SIGINT teams provided direct support (DS) to each battalion task force. Total participation was 11 or 12 intelligence personnel per battalion task force.

We didn't deploy remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems (REMBASS) nor ground surveillance radars (GSR). In retrospect, these assets would have contributed to airport security after the initial airborne assault. Snipers and infiltrators were a minor distraction at the airport, but they could have presented a greater threat had the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) been better organized.

In addition to the DS teams, we created a HUMINT cell to provide general intelligence support to the division. Personnel in the remaining companies and two augmentees from the corps Tactical Exploitation Battalion made up this team. Additionally, the division G2 sent the CI officer from the G2 CI section. After 5 days, the team was augmented with three additional Spanish linguists. We established MP support before

the team deployed, with a linkup occurring during initial manifest. The entire package deployed as part of division troops. This relatively large section provided considerable support to the division's CI/IPW effort.

The MI battalion's assault technical control and analysis element (TCAE) deployed as part of the division assault CP. This element jumped in with three PRC-77 radios, three KY-57 speech security sets, and a 3-day supply of batteries. Two radio teletypewriter (RATT) rig operators also jumped in to operate the battalion's RATT rig that had been heavy dropped. In our battalion, the S3 heads the assault TCAE during emergency deployments. The S3 and everyone else on the team had previously trained together during division and corps emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDRE). The prior training went a long way toward forging a combat ready team.

### Communications Problems

The nonlinear battlefield is characterized by increased distances between elements. Such was the case during Operation JUST CAUSE. Inherent problems we faced were reduced communications capabilities and a more decentralized intelligence reporting system. Current FM VHF man-packed radio systems used by airborne and light tactical units don't provide enough power and range for dispersed operations. Tactical communications were normally handled by low wattage PRC-77 radios. The one exception was a few high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) that were heavy dropped. These were later mounted with higher powered VRC series radios that had been man-packed and dropped.

By doctrine, the TCAE controls and tasks all communications intercept equipment, and it synthesizes reports from the TA cells. What happened with our maneuver brigade at the Torrijos Airport illustrates the weaknesses of current MI communications: During the first 72 hours, the TCAE was in contact with the brigade TA cell and was well within radio range. However, once the battalion task forces deployed, the brigade TA cell was out of VHF range of its PRD-10 and PRD-11 low level voice intercept (LLVI) teams. Later, the TA cell moved "forward" with the brigade CP and assumed its mission at Panama Viejo. Although in contact with two of the three teams, the TA cell could no longer communicate with the division TCAE still at Torrijos. We finally solved the problem by adding multichannel secure voice communications.



Because of the distances between elements, TCAE tasking and transmission suffered. The centralized SIGINT tasking and reporting system was decentralized since the TCAE was sometimes out of range of its TA cell. This didn't hinder intelligence reporting to the task forces, but it did slow down SIGINT derived reporting from the TCAE to the G2. Consequently, tasking and transmission to and from the battalion was sporadic and, at times, nonexistent.

HUMINT reporting to and from the MI battalion CP also suffered. We gave the battalion command frequency to the HUMINT net to laterally pass information among the HUMINT teams. This net wasn't an intelligence reporting net, but a working net which gave the teams access to each other's sources and allowed the comparison of black, white, and gray lists. This "information sharing net" had been sorely lacking during previous EDREs and other exercises. Although a sound concept, it was plagued by problems similar to those that prevented the TA cell and LLVI teams from communicating at great distances. But when this net was fully operational, it provided a stream of HUMINT information, which proved to be invaluable to our success.

If tactical intelligence in support of light contingency units is to have a greater role on the nonlinear battlefield, we need a reliable tactical manpacked radio system that can range out to 20 or 30 kilometers, distances envisioned by the Air-Land Operations-Future concept.

### Temporary Solution

We tried many field expedient solutions, but they had their limitations. Normally, teams jump and deploy with the antenna heads of RC-292 antennas, transmission cable, and some communications wire. This provides an increased range of VHF communications over the standard long whip antennas, as long as a building or other structure is available to support the antenna head. Precut long wire antennas also provide some advantage, but still limit the team's mobility.

A solution would be to deploy retransmission teams to bridge the communications gaps. However, current airborne modified tables of organization and equipment afford only vehicle mounted VRC series radios. These are often unavailable during the first hours of conflict because of competing divisional priority vehicle lists. Additionally, retransmission teams would have to deploy between the operational and security perimeters

of the various task forces, exposing them to interdiction or capture. Even so, the battalion often conducts helicopter swing load exercises to simulate the need to insert retransmission teams to link critical communications nodes.

Realistically, it's unlikely helicopters would be dedicated to support the MI effort during an actual conflict. For longer distances, the organic RATT rigs are quite reliable, but also may not be available during the initial hours of combat. Once again, the solution is a better high powered tactical and manpacked radio system. If we're serious about the nonlinear battlefield, we must devote more money and effort to the tactical communications system of MI contingency organizations.

A related issue for airborne and light units is the airborne LLVI equipment's weight. A popular expression in the battalion rings true: "You haven't lived until you've jumped out of an aircraft with a 150-pound rucksack strapped to your body." Jumping this bulky equipment is only half the problem. Having to carry it in rucksacks for extended periods is the other half, especially when LLVI teams have to keep up with foot soldiers carrying lighter loads. Airborne and light forces need lighter LLVI equipment. Commercial lightweight scanner equipment is a good alternative for units that can purchase locally. Although these products don't have the direction finding accuracy of military LLVI equipment, some provide line of bearing accuracy, which is responsive and often preferred.

### How Much HUMINT?

The big money-maker during Operation JUST CAUSE was HUMINT. The qualifier was the willingness of the Panamanian people to provide information about PDF personnel and arms cache sites. HUMINT teams provided the bulk of intelligence produced by all the supporting DS and general support (GS) elements. At times, the sheer numbers of captured enemy soldiers and displaced personnel were overwhelming.

Within 6 to 8 hours after the airborne assault into Torrijos, a HUMINT team began screening and interrogation operations at the main airport terminal. Approximately 350 captured or detained personnel were in a makeshift assembly area outside the main entrance to the terminal. For 72 hours, the interrogation and CI team screened these people. Some proved to be PDF personnel in disguise. Others were airline passengers waiting to board flights. Many were airport officials and employees whose loyalties were



questionable. The volume and complexity of the operation proved very challenging indeed to the small team.

The questions we never answered are: How long could this element have functioned if these numbers had continued? At what point would the effort begin to decrease in returns? Luckily, after the initial large group of detainees, the numbers were more manageable: 20 arrived one day, 40 more another day, and so on. It was still a challenge, though, as black listers and other PDF personnel were weeded out and evacuated to the Joint Intelligence Task Force (JINTF) EPW compound for further interrogation.

The example also highlights another problem: Current MI organizations have a much higher ratio of SIGINT to HUMINT personnel. With the exclusion of GSR/REMBASS and long range surveillance detachment (LRSD) personnel, this ratio is four to one. Only when you include GSR/REMBASS and LRSD personnel does the ratio balance out. But still, it doesn't alleviate the CI/IPW personnel shortage. One obvious solution is to increase CI/IPW manning levels. Then, a more effective and viable 24-hour operational capability could be maintained at DS and GS levels.

The other solution depends on a larger augmentation from the corps MI Tactical Exploitation Battalion. However, competing priorities often divert many assets that otherwise could support this mission. The whole issue of ownership of tactical MI assets plays a big part in the capability of the divisional MI unit to conduct its share of battlefield interrogations efficiently enough to sustain itself over the long haul.

Thus far, this discussion has focused on screening and interrogating EPWs and displaced persons. However, a much larger problem HUMINT teams faced was the inability to rapidly exploit captured documents. The effort put into this task was equally monumental, but couldn't be done nearly as well as this most important source of information warranted. Again, the limiting factors were personnel shortages and the priority given to screening and interrogations. To solve this, we relegated document exploitation almost exclusively to SIGINT linguists in the battalion task forces. Qualified stateside linguists with area expertise were air-landed and pressed into service, but were subsequently committed to the CI/IPW effort or used as interpreters by ground commanders. The stacks of captured documents continued to grow, and we eventually

shipped them out to the JINTF document exploitation facility.


## Conclusions

The AirLand Operations-Future concept is accurate in assessing that future conflict will demand a highly trained Army. We must be ready to deploy while keeping the flexibility needed to tailor a combat force to meet global challenges. Flexibility will be maintained by ensuring a force mix that includes airborne, light, special forces, and armor/mechanized units. The very nature of global warfare requires a close working relationship and a joint mind-set with sister services. MI will have to support them all. Despite some minor operational problems, MI is a sound and proven concept that only needs occasional retooling and refining.

This last year has produced extreme swings through the Operational Continuum. This is a clear indicator that the next conflict will probably be as different from the previous one as JUST CAUSE was from DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A careful study of this kind of contingency operation and an analysis within the context of the type and level of conflict it represents is a sure fire way to ensure MI doctrine and concepts maintain the adaptability and flexibility needed to support a changing Army.

Operation JUST CAUSE was a glimpse of what MI doctrine and concepts are up against in light and airborne units. Chances are the observations extracted from this operation may fall into the proverbial "lessons learned" category which often characterizes our endless search for reinvention. However, if simply repeating those experiences and lessons of past conflicts serves to drive a point home, then the point should be it's time to relook our MI formula for success and apply those small, but important, ideas toward ensuring that our tactical intelligence organization remains the finest support organization in the profession of arms.

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# WARFIGHTER:

## A Reserve Military Intelligence Battalion Perspective

By Major William V. Wenger,  
Captain Douglas D. Gardner, and  
Captain Daniel E. Hawk

You're in a Reserve MI battalion and you're going to participate in a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) WARFIGHTER exercise. You immediately have many questions. But answers are hard to find, and you often get conflicting opinions. Many articles, both general explanations of the WARFIGHTER experience and specific MI treatments, have been published, but none answers the critical questions:

- What is currently required of the MI battalion for WARFIGHTER?
- How can participants and the BCTP staff

better train division staffs to use MI assets and MI battalions to prepare for and participate in this exercise?

This article is an attempt to provide the answers you need. It's based on our battalion's recent participation in WARFIGHTER.

WARFIGHTER is designed to train division personnel to use coordination and planning in preparation for their "first battle." Our units, the 40th Infantry Division (M) and the 140th MI Battalion, spent 14 months preparing for the exercise. The long-term cooperation, training, and development of SOPs proved to be of great value. The division and the battalion came to the exercise coordinated, prepared, and knowledgeable about the personalities involved and the methodologies needed to fight together.

## Task Organization

Let's back up a bit. You're a Reserve MI battalion commander or S3 at EX-14 months. What can you expect?

First of all, you'll need to project battalion manpower requirements using division and BCTP guidance. You can get an idea of the manpower requirements by reviewing the major WARFIGHTER events shown in the Chart. Be flexible because these requirements will change during train up. Manpower requirements are hard to project, but by using a matrix we planned a support based on our exercise expectations. Due to budget constraints, we could provide only 84 soldiers. Optimum support should have been approximately 140 soldiers, including simulation center (SIMCEN) workers and 20 support people. These 84 soldiers, however, successfully supported the exercise.

The exercise organizational structure looks like this: The battalion operations center (BOC) is collocated with the technical control and analysis element (TCAE) in the field; and the platoon operations centers (POCs) and electronic warfare (EW) assets are played in the SIMCEN.

Data that comes from the SIMCEN is intelligence, **not** raw data. A 20-minute transmission delay is built into the BCTP intelligence collection model (BICM) program. This delay simulates the processing time from the collection asset through the POC to the TCAE. You may want to negotiate this time lag with the BCTP staff. Since the TCAE doesn't process, you don't need a SCIF. However, we set up a tactical SCIF and got it approved by the Special Security Group, FORSCOM. This was an additional training experience only, but it proved extremely valuable. Of course, this scenario will change should the

EVENT	REPETITIONS	MI BATTALION PARTICIPANTS	LOCATION	DURATION (DAYS)
Division-level Planning Conference	10 to 15	Battalion Commander, S3, Division LNO (optional)	Division Home Station at Annual Training (AT)	1 to 2
Brigade-level Planning Conference	5 to 7	Brigade IEWSEs, S3, (S1 or S2)	Brigade Home Station	1
Division and Brigade Map Exercise	3 to 5	IEWSE	Brigade Home Station at AT	0.5
Division and Brigade Staff Train-up	4 to 6	Battalion Commander, XO, S1, S2, S3, S4	Division Home Station	1
Affiliated Unit's WARFIGHTER Exercise	1	Battalion Commander, S3	Affiliated Unit's Home Station	3 to 5
BCTP Seminar	1	Battalion Commander, XO, S3, SIMCEN OICs, TCAE OIC, Division LNO	Fort Leavenworth	10
Operational Test with BCTP Computer	1	Battalion Commander, XO, S3, LNO, all SIMCEN participants	Corps HQ	5
Train-up before WARFIGHTER	1	All Battalions and SIMCEN	AT Location	2
MI National Exercise and COMM Exercise	1	All Battalions and SIMCEN	AT Location	1
WARFIGHTER	1	All Battalions and SIMCEN	AT Location	3.5 to 5.5

## Major Events of WARFIGHTER

exercise become classified.

The BCTP staff recommends the battalion commander and/or S3 be located in the SIMCEN. We didn't agree with this and assigned the assistant S3 instead, augmented by a previous S3 who served as a shift OIC. The commander and S3 could then perform their doctrinal roles as OICs at the BOC, and serve aggressively as special MI staff advisors to the commanding general and staff. This arrangement also leaves the commander and S3 free to brief the many visiting VIPs. SIMCEN personnel are detached early in the preparation period, before the exercise; thereafter, they're essentially lost for the MI field operation.

### Communications

Communications are absolutely critical to a successful WARFIGHTER exercise. To make sure essential communications elements are established, use all doctrinal communications and augment them with field facsimile machines and sole-user phone lines, if possible. Don't rely on radio teletypewriter (RATT) rigs to relay the high volume of traffic generated by BICM. In our 108-hour exercise, TCAE processed over 10,900 tactical reports (TACREPs). Of these, more than 4,000 were passed from the TCAE to the collection management and dissemination section. The intelligence and electronic warfare support elements (IEWSEs) listened to approximately 2,000 TACREPs and extracted intelligence for immediate use. The RATT rigs are too slow and unreliable for this large amount of traffic.

As you can see, FM links are critical. An FM net with backup should be established between the SIMCEN and the TCAE/BOC. The IEWSEs also need two FM links; not one, as stated in doctrine. While this organization is artificial under current doctrine, the volume of TACREPs isn't realistic and often includes information not requested. Secure communications aren't required, but, obviously, should be exercised when possible. Other FM uses include a radio set with headphones for IEWSEs to monitor traffic between POCs and the TCAE. Under normal operations, you'd do this anyway because of the data's classification. Headphones also help the RTO concentrate in the din of the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). FM links also could provide a second net for operational tasking and aid coordination with the BOC and the IEWSEs.

We also suggest direct link (FM or sole-user wire) between the BOC and the division fire sup-

port element (FSE). This, and IEWSE coordination with FSEs at brigade TOCs, provided 80 percent of artillery targets during our WARFIGHTER exercise. For accuracy, it's critical that target locations be correlated using multiple sources. Plan simultaneous or coordinated jamming and artillery fires for maximum target attrition.

The sheer volume of traffic makes data correlation difficult. The operation controllers reported that single TACREPs give less than a 50 percent chance of successful targeting. Nevertheless, after the exercise, it was rumored that 65 percent of artillery targets fired were based on the single grid coordinates that we acquired. Of targets fired, 95 percent were kills. BCTP will surely make adjustments to ensure no repetition of this success ratio.

You must have a direct communications link with the division aviation brigade to successfully coordinate QUICKFIX missions. The joint exercise support system (JESS) computer program requires you to make both a mission request and an operation request to successfully fly the missions. This means that the TCAE/BOC requests division aviation to fly a mission. Division aviation contacts their people in the SIMCEN who then fly the mission per TCAE direction, after coordination for joint suppression of enemy air defense. At the same time, the TCAE sends a request to the SIMCEN EW people to target QUICKFIX objectives.

Aviation and EW personnel coordinate in the SIMCEN, and together the mission is "flown." Only then will JESS generate intelligence output from QUICKFIX. To ensure a constant flow of QUICKFIX traffic, you must plan overlapping flights with the EW mission "handed-off" each flight.

### Corps and Echelons Above Corps

Corps and EAC intelligence participation is weak and unrealistic in WARFIGHTER. To compensate for this program weakness, you can manually input their reporting. To do this, include the corps TCAE in your planning, properly man it with qualified soldiers from outside units (two soldiers per shift), and fully and aggressively integrate it into the exercise. This requires diligent effort by battalion, division, and corps planners. If you choose not to do this, you'll leave a severe and unrealistic intelligence gap in your WARFIGHTER exercise.

National intelligence-gathering assets are played by preprogrammed incremental output.



No effort you make during the exercise can change the quantity, quality, or emphasis of the intelligence from these sources. However, you can work with BCTP Leavenworth and the participating corps G2 beforehand to free play some of these assets.

### **Flank and Rear Unit Activity**

Intelligence from the flanks and any units passing through your rear area is similarly weak. Only one or two scriptor/simulators play these critical intelligence sources. Again, work with BCTP Leavenworth and corps planners to make their sources more active.

### **HUMINT**

Divisional HUMINT is also a significant BCTP weakness. Since JESS doesn't play HUMINT, exercise participants must generate and report their own. Usually, corps provides one or two counterintelligence (CI) soldiers to portray this asset. Close coordination with your corps G2 and staff before the exercise will determine the volume and quality of intelligence you'll gain.

As in war, developing HUMINT sources depends on close interaction between the MI battalion, division G2, G5, the provost marshal, and, most critically, the maneuver brigades. The brigades must move enemy prisoners of war, deserters, or suspected persons to brigade holding areas, and from there to division holding areas. If this coordination isn't made in JESS at the SIMCEN, no intelligence will result.

Two qualified and experienced CI and interrogation specialists can operate out of the TCAE/BOC to develop and implement the collection plan. Doctrinally, this operation would be handled by the CI officer in G2. Again, depending on tactical SOPs and division expertise, constant pressure on the system is the key to operating, integrating, and maximizing this source.

### **Asset Management**

Your placement of electronic warfare support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) assets is critical for success in WARFIGHTER. Despite repeated efforts to obtain clarification, we never got a clear answer as to the effective ranges of simulated MI assets. The answer came only during the exercise:

- ESM ground-mounted assets range out to 30 kilometers.
- ESM airborne assets range out to 60 kilometers.

- ECM functions at near doctrinal ranges. However, because of various, relatively undefined "obscurity" factors, plan for 5 to 10 kilometers less.

Systems such as GUARDRAIL, COMPASS CALL, RIVET JOINT, and WILD WEASEL function at near doctrinal ranges and effectiveness. They must, however, be played manually by EAC.

Effective ESM and ECM depend on placing the equipment as far forward as practical. Future BICM criteria will likely be more doctrinal and terrain dependent. Note that attrition of MI assets is determined by preprogrammed algorithms. However, attrition of all other units is determined only after the specific unit is attacked and casualties are sustained.

### **Logistics**

Our battalion made a significant contribution to future MI participation in WARFIGHTER exercises. At the preexercise operational test, the battalion liaison officer (LNO) was assigned to the division for the full year of exercise preparation. The LNO developed the logistic subsets necessary for JESS to more efficiently play MI logistics. These subsets require the IEWSE to coordinate logistic support and movement planning with the brigades. Company team commanders assigned at each brigade TOC significantly enhanced these team elements for WARFIGHTER.

This augmentation allowed the IEWSEs to concentrate more intently on the extremely high volume of intelligence traffic. The logistic management experience of WARFIGHTER was very valuable. We learned just how difficult it is to properly support widely dispersed teams and assets in the field.

### **SIMCEN Operations**

POC representatives manned the communications for the battalion intelligence cell in the SIMCEN. They received TCAE tasking messages, movement orders, and resupply instructions, which they input into the BICM. When the maneuver terminal operator got the movement orders, the POC representative would cancel the tasking in BICM for that particular asset. Resupply instructions went to the S1/S4 terminal operator.

If the instructions included moving assets, we cancelled the missions for the assets. S1/S4 representatives posted the resource status board as changes occurred. Every 20 minutes, the BICM

spewed out TACREPs for every active tasking—approximately 800 an hour for all assets tasked.

We had to dedicate a soldier at the BICM printer (also known as the "printer from Hell") to distribute the high volume of reports to respective recipients (for example, signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, ground surveillance radar [GSR], and long-range surveillance detachments [LRSDs]). The functional expert who received the report had to—

- Write the TACREP.
- Send the report to the user via available communications—usually, the TCAE; but some were sent from GSRs to combat battalions or brigades. LRSD reports were sent directly to the G2.
- Ensure the report was logged into the log terminal after it was sent.

During the exercise, we established "floaters" to help out in several areas because of the high volume of information and because mental fatigue became commonplace. The illustration shows the overall flow of information.

OICs were the "Honest Brokers" of the SIM-CEN. They held duplication of effort and reporting to a minimum. They were the points of contact for the civilian controller when it became

apparent there were gaps in tasking.

## Perspective


Can WARFIGHTER do a better job in training divisions to use MI as a combat multiplier? Can we use WARFIGHTER to doctrinally train the MI battalion?

In answering these questions, we need to recognize that WARFIGHTER is designed to train the division staff in organizing for battle and operating in a realistic war-fighting scenario. The exercise and the computer structure are not designed to incorporate detailed MI activities. MI is only one of many combat multipliers tasked to train the division staff. However, with concerted effort and coordination, MI participation in WARFIGHTER and the resulting training for both the division and the MI battalion can be realistic and valuable.

## Benefits

Our battalion received two outstanding benefits from WARFIGHTER:

- The train-up to the exercise was as valuable, perhaps even more valuable, than the exercise itself. As a result of WARFIGHTER, all current major players at division know the importance of MI and something about how it operates. This is



WARFIGHTER Information Flow

Computer Graphics:  
Kazuko Klever

perhaps a more evident and dramatic result with a Reserve as opposed to an Active duty division.

- The simulated experience of supporting an entire division with an entire MI battalion is rare for a Reserve unit and infrequent for the Active Component. WARFIGHTER was a rare opportunity to reuse and enhance many standard procedures.

### Weaknesses and Areas of Concern

Primary WARFIGHTER weaknesses and areas of concern for MI are logistics and communications:

- MI logistics is a weakness in our battalion and, indeed, in doctrine. As a result of WARFIGHTER, we're reviewing the relationship and coordination with division G1, G4, and support command and brigade S1s, S4s, and support areas. We're reexamining the use and coordination for main supply routes and all internal support mechanisms to operate in such a widely dispersed mode.

- Communications are critical to the success of MI operations; however, WARFIGHTER proved them to be a severe weakness. The Army has a lot of work to do to enhance current organic capabilities.

Negative impacts of WARFIGHTER on the MI battalion include—

- Other battalion training took a back seat for almost a year, especially at company, platoon, section, and individual soldier levels.

- The staff and headquarters elements of the MI battalion couldn't participate realistically due to the lack of doctrinal employment and operating structure.

- Division staff members weren't forced to use MI sufficiently and realistically; this weakened the training experience for them.

BICM treats MI in WARFIGHTER uniquely. Unlike other branches, MI assets aren't accurately simulated in the computer, and, therefore, must be played manually. This manual representation of battlefield intelligence is extremely manpower intensive. A single person can "play" several artillery or maneuver elements in the SIMCEN; in comparison, it takes close to 20 people per shift to play the assets organic to a single MI battalion. In addition, BICM currently does not accurately portray MI collection. We had to play almost all intelligence collection manually.

Planning was a problem because no one person was seen as a reliable source for the specifics and limits of WARFIGHTER. You'll need to work

closely with division and corps G2s, as well as Leavenworth representatives, to plan staffing and organization. The earlier you do this, the more beneficial the training experience will be.

### Suggested Improvements

To reduce the negative impact on battalion training, make sure individual and small-unit leaders, in the absence of senior leaders, conduct aggressive training throughout the year. The battalion staff and often company commanders, their officers, and senior NCOs will be needed frequently to train for the exercise with the division.

Senior leaders must address the lack of realistic MI participation in WARFIGHTER throughout the training year and especially during the exercise. This will ensure both the division staff and the MI battalion are coordinated to the maximum extent possible and are able to get the maximum benefit from the training.

BICM is essentially an all-source intelligence fire hose, and we were told there is no way to discriminate among the data it spews. For the TCAE and other processing elements, this is extremely unrealistic. It adds time to the intelligence cycle, it distracts people away from more pertinent training, and it creates a dangerous illusion about the normal quantity of data MI assets generate.


BICM requires POCs to set up in the SIMCEN to screen reports and to send only the appropriate ones forward to the TCAE. The sheer quantity of BICM output caused an enormous bottleneck, both in the SIMCEN and at the TCAE. This data glut made it impossible to discriminate at either end between information which directly supported tasking and data which was extraneous.

We finally resorted to a courier service from the SIMCEN to the TCAE to bypass the overloaded radios (our RATT rigs had gone down). The courier service was a mixed blessing, however. We received information more quickly (only an hour or two after execution or game time), but it tended to arrive in clumps of several hundred TACREPs, most of which were redundant or irrelevant. At best, the information only provided a "snapshot" of the battlefield.

In reality, the TCAE should be able to provide timely information in response to the G2's priority intelligence requirements. This analysis would provide a picture of the battlefield; this picture would allow the TCAE to further refine its efforts to continue the flow of critical data; the data,







# INTELLIGENCE

First Lieutenant Rhonda K. R. Cook

## in the Military Police Battalion

Much of the MIOBC instruction focuses on teaching lieutenants the S2 skills needed in combat maneuver battalions, even though many lieutenants get assigned to combat support or service support units. Although basic S2 skills are the same in all units, the needs of the commanders are not. The S2 can best support the commander with intelligence by understanding the unit's mission and tailoring his or her efforts toward those requirements.

My first S2 assignment was with an MP battalion during Operation DESERT STORM. MPs have a major responsibility in conducting rear operations, which include four primary missions: Battlefield circulation and control; area security; enemy prisoners of war (EPW) handling; and law and order. Because the intelligence requirements for each of these missions are unique, I want to pass along a few tips to other MP battalion S2s on how to best support the commander's needs.

### Battlefield Circulation and Control

**Request plenty of maps.** MP units use more maps than most other combat, combat support, or service support units. It takes 51 sets of maps to outfit an MP line company down to team level. If you're short of maps (which you will be), issue them creatively; base your distribution on areas of operation and keep an accurate count for cross leveling.

**Establish liaison with local authorities.** The keys to this mission are joint patrols and checkpoints, as well as shared information between the MPs and local authorities. The S2 and your local CI or civil affairs team (with organic linguist support) can help establish liaison with local authorities.

**Use police as collectors.** The mobile MP fighting teams are often some of the first people to traverse an area, especially when they're mapping or signing supply routes. Know your higher headquarter's priority intelligence requirements, particularly those dealing with terrain analysis and road networks, and disseminate specific information requests to company level. MP teams are excellent sources of information about what is actually on the battlefield.

### **Area Security**

**Familiarize yourself with FM 19-30, Physical Security.** The MPs will perform static guard missions to ensure the physical security of facilities such as troop housing areas, tactical headquarters, and logistic storage points. A good physical security plan includes vulnerability assessments (provided by CI teams) and base defense considerations. A good working knowledge of FM 19-30 will help you plan static guard type missions.

**Understand base cluster defense plans.** The MPs will conduct area security of rear area base clusters. To help with this, the S2 needs a thorough understanding of the base cluster defense plan, including priority protection points. Terrorism and sabotage in the base cluster are the commander's main concerns.

**Coordinate with local CI teams.** CI teams often collocate with MPs on the battlefield and are available to advise and assist the S2s, since they can often provide the best information on the rear area threat. Ask your CI teams for vulnerability assessments of the base cluster priority protection points. Use their local contacts to find out about and to advise the commander on regional sentiments. Request information through their points of contact and MI channels. The CI element is an important link in information flow to the MP battalion S2.

### **EPW Handling**

**Know FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.** During EPW handling and processing, questions will arise as to what does or does not comply with the Geneva Conventions. Be the authority. Have the actual document on-hand and study it. Know the provisions inside and out for EPW handling.

**Know enemy order of battle.** Know the strengths of opposing forces and find out as much as possible about the individual enemy soldier. What weapons does he carry? What is his basic

ammunition load? What uniform does he wear? What are his convictions? How is his morale? Focus on the individual. (But keep in mind the enemy will vary from unit to unit.) Give your commander an idea of what to expect when he or she receives EPWs.

**Keep abreast of current battlefield damage assessments.** Use the battlefield damage assessments to update enemy personnel and equipment strengths. You can more accurately estimate potential EPW numbers if you frequently update enemy statistics. Paint a picture of what your commander can expect; he or she needs accurate figures to plan for logistics at the holding areas.

**Build rapport with the senior interrogation technician.** This individual is responsible for interrogations at the EPW holding area. Maintain a good working relationship with interrogation cell personnel; you can get a lot of good information from them, although it's unconfirmed intelligence at this point. Interrogators can often provide the best information on the individual enemy soldier, so develop rapport with them.

### **Law and Order**

**Screen the MP blotter.** Reports of criminal activity may sometimes be of intelligence value. Stolen vehicles, missing persons, or abandoned equipment can be used to identify subversives operating in the rear area. Screen the MP reports each day and report any suspicious activity to your local CI team.

**Keep the command informed about terrorist activity.** Gather as much information as possible about terrorist groups and active subversives in your area. Keep abreast of the local threat, and keep the commander as well informed as possible.

The key to success as an S2 is to be aggressive in obtaining intelligence. The information is out there, you just have to locate and develop good sources. Keep in mind what your commander needs to complete the mission, and be proactive in acquiring that information.

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# PROPONENT NOTES

As indicated in the last issue, the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) will provide a regular column on proponent issues to MIPB. This is the first such article. Although some of the actions described aren't complete or approved by DA, we want you to know the latest developments.

We recently chose seven nominees for induction into the MI Corps Hall of Fame. Their induction will take place in ceremonies during an MI Corps anniversary celebration on July 11 and 12 at Fort Huachuca. The inductees are listed in Major General Menoher's column.

A National Guard Bureau survey indicates approximately 30 percent of the positions being developed for the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) require translation and interpretation skills. Operations in Panama and the Middle East tend to support this finding. Therefore, the MI proponent is currently staffing an action to establish MOS 97L, Language Specialist, for the Reserve Component. MOS 97L's principal duties will be to conduct or supervise interpretation and translation functions. Recruitment would focus on personnel with acquired language skills. This will shorten the training time to become MOS qualified. MOS 97L will be a career MOS that progresses from entry level to MSG/1SG. No conversion of existing MI MOSs on the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) TOE is required.

## Officers

The Chief of the MI Corps will soon send senior intelligence officers at corps and division a memorandum explaining the Branch Contact Program. This program will bring MI basic branch officers currently detailed to other branches into contact with senior MI officers in the field. Through this contact, branch detail officers can better understand the advantages that having served in a detail branch can give them in MI. The Contact Program will also alleviate concerns about being "cut off" from MI—a concern that has caused several of these officers to request branch transfer.

MI Branch indicates they have a problem getting individual officer photographs. The photograph is an important part of each officer's

record. Some personnel actions are being delayed or adversely affected because the officer's records don't include a current photograph. MI branch has especially had difficulty in getting updated photographs, with correct (MI) Branch insignia, of recently transferred or returned (from branch detail assignments) MI officers. Senior intelligence officers can help by ensuring their officers have proper photographs on file with MI Branch!

A joint U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Aviation Center memorandum went to PERSCOM last January updating policies and procedures for accessing, assigning, and training MI aviators (15C35 officers). The updated memorandum provides several realistic MI aviator career paths; identifies requirements and time lines for accessing MI aviators; and establishes coordination points between Fort Huachuca and Fort Rucker regarding these dual-skilled officers. We have implemented these policies and some new MI aviators are already benefiting from increased intelligence training opportunities. Finally, both proponents have stepped up efforts to inform field commanders and senior staff officers that they need to use these officers in documented 15C35 assignments.

Recently, DA accession boards selected ROTC and USMA cadets for active duty and branching in FY91 and FY92. The ROTC selection board chose 375 cadets for active duty service in MI. However, 321 of those will initially be branch detailed for 3 to 4 years. MI remains a popular branch with cadets; it was the second most requested branch among active duty selectees. In addition, the averages of all ROTC measures (camp score, GPA, and PMS evaluation) for cadets selected for MI were higher than the corresponding averages for all cadets selected for active duty. Meanwhile, West Point cadets conducted branch drawings in January. Twenty women and eleven men chose MI, filling 97 percent of the quota available. Seven of these will initially be branch detailed. All in all, MI again is guaranteed the "best and brightest" officers to lead our soldiers in the future.

## Warrant Officers

Warrant officer applicants, as well as their

commanders, need to make sure applicants meet the minimum prerequisites. The applicant must—

- Be a sergeant.
- Be a BNCOC graduate.
- Have at least 4 years operational experience.
- Have had 2 operational assignments.

Waivers are granted on a case-by-case basis. However, historically, warrant officers with significant waivers are less competitive when boarded. OCMI is developing a Life Cycle Model for MI warrant officers to identify education and assignment opportunities that will prepare them for positions of increased responsibility as senior and master warrant officers.

### Enlisted

We've recommended and forwarded the following Career Management Field (CMF) 98 ASI changes to Commander, U.S. Army Personnel Integration Command (USAPIC) for review and worldwide staffing:

- ASI M7 (Intermediate Non-Morse Analysis), MOS 98K, applies to skill level 1 to 3 only.
- ASI N2 (Senior Non-Morse Analysis), MOS 98K, indicates the A-231-0600 Course (Intermediate Non-Morse Analysis Course) is a prerequisite for attending the A-232-0058 Course (Advanced Non-Morse Analysis Course).
- ASI K3 (Communication-Electronic Warfare Equipment Operations), MOS 98G, updates current equipment being taught.
- ASI 5T, MOS 98J is a new ASI to track personnel trained in "Classic Wizard Reporter" system operations.

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) systems represent some of the most sophisticated military computer technology. To keep up with rapidly evolving IEW systems and computer technology, Intelligence School, Devens, (USAISD) is currently reviewing the training devices used. By FY92, USAISD will replace outdated minicomputers with SUN computer workstations and other more advanced computers in the MI Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Maintenance Courses.

The SUN computer workstations are more complex than ordinary PCs, more like MICRO-VAX computers in terms of complexity. SUN computer workstations use the UNIX operating system, and most of the electronics are on a single mother board with the major chips in surface mount sockets. When trained, MI maintenance soldiers will be able to transfer these UNIX skills

to VAX Operating Systems and other multiuser operating systems such as SUN computer workstations.

Because of the low density and the top-heavy structure of MOS 33V, we've asked USAPIC to combine MOSs 33R and 33V into one MOS with an ASI. Former 33V soldiers will receive transition ASI Y2 to identify that they need transition training to become 33R qualified. They'll lose the transition ASI Y2 when they complete supervised OJT and the commander certifies them, or when they complete the 33R resident course. Soldiers who hold MOS 33V and complete the resident course in Aerial Sensor Repairer at Fort Huachuca will receive an ASI for it. ASI U1 and W1 will be deleted from the ASI inventory, but the courses will be retained and taught on an as needed basis.

USAISD has formed a task force to conduct a preliminary analysis to merge MOSs 98D, 98H, and 98K into one MOS—"98M." The term "98M" is used now for discussion and tracking purposes but may not be the term that is ultimately used for that MOS. We're considering the merger for the following reasons:

- Projected force reductions.
- The common skill of Morse code for all three MOSs.
- An NSA requirement for a multimode collector.
- Improved assignments and use based on the above reasons.

Results of the analysis will not be available for several months.

Effective October 1, MOSs 33M, 33P, and 33Q will be consolidated into MOS 33Y, "Strategic Systems Repairer." We're currently training AIT students in MOS 33Y, but awarding them 33P and 33Q upon graduation. The DCSPER has approved the action and is reclassifying personnel.

As a result of German unification and U.S. force reductions, MOS 98G, German Linguist, requirements have been sharply reduced. Until DA DCSPER announces an official position on language requirements, we recommend 98G German linguists submit a DA Form 4187 to retrain into shortage languages such as Russian and Korean. Soldiers who don't have a DLAB score of 95 or higher should request Spanish instead. MOS 98G German linguists who have a second language with a 1/1 proficiency in Russian, Korean, Spanish, Chinese-Mandarin, Vietnamese, Czech, Arabic, or Persian-Farsi may request to



change their control language to one of these languages. Because of the limited number of training seats, 98G German linguists stationed overseas have first priority for retraining when they PCS.

MI CMF statistics for enlisted personnel are given in the chart. The source is DAPC-45 month ending February 1991.

MI CMF STATISTICS			
MOS	AUTHORIZED	OPERATIONAL	PERCENT
CMF 96			
96B	3237	3214	99
96D	795	788	99
96H	154	148	96
96R	1165	1291	110
97B	1459	1585	108
97E	850	977	115
97G	390	447	115
96Z	42	45	107
97Z	15	15	100
CMF 98			
98C	2864	2879	100
98D	335	438	131
98G	3765	3591	95
98H	1107	1280	116
98J	1119	1117	100
98Z	353	328	93
CMF 33			
33R	283	285	104
33T	545	582	99
33V	101	104	103
33Y	724	839	116
33Z	43	43	100

During a recent force alignment review, we noted that MOSs 96B, 96D, 97B, and 97G have been chronically short of sergeants for more than a year. Commanders should be aware of the promotion opportunities in these MOSs and should aggressively work to promote qualified soldiers through timely boarding and attendance at the Primary Leadership Development Course.

The Combined Arms Command has proposed a new ASI for the Maneuver Control System (MCS) Master Operator. MCS is a general purpose user Tactical Automated Command and Control System, which currently has no MOS or ASI. Various MOS 96B and 98C skill levels would attend a 108-hour Master Operator Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia, or a 96-hour New Equip-

ment Training Team Master Operator Course to qualify for the MOS/ASI. MOSs will be fielded at two corps, seven divisions, and two armored cavalry regiments. The MI proponent supports this proposal.

We requested last July that TENCAP ASI T4 be deleted and its functions be separated into three distinct ASIs for better personnel management and assignment. Once DCSPER approves the packet, a new, more specific ASI will be assigned to soldiers currently holding ASI T4.

OCMI wants to consolidate two imagery based MOSs: 96D, Imagery Analyst, and 96H, Aerial Intelligence Specialist/Imagery Ground Station Operator. We're developing milestones and a training strategy for the combined imagery MOS.

### Civilians

The DCSPER approved the activation of civilian proponent Armywide on March 18. This culminated a 3-year effort with MI serving as one of the test proponents. During the test phase, we redrafted and refined responsibilities in AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Proponent System, to apply to the civilian constituency. The new objectives are to fully integrate the civilian constituency into the Army team and to promote greater rapport between military and civilian members.

Occupational guides interpret the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System primary grading standard with respect to the duties and responsibilities of specific occupational series or specialties. Army Intelligence subject matter experts developed the Army Occupational Guides (AOGs) with Intelligence Personnel Management Office (IPMO) and PERSCOM assistance. The IPMO is studying AOG test results for the following series: Security Administration, GS-080; Intelligence Specialist, GS-0132 in Intelligence Operations; Intelligence Specialist, GS-0132 in Intelligence and Threat Support; and multiseries AOGs for Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production.

The goal is to implement these AOGs this summer. The AOG for Intelligence Specialist positions in combat developments is now being staffed for comment. Point of contact is Mr. Sam Delajoux, OCMI, AV 821-1975, FTS 853-1975, or Commercial (602) 533-1975.

For more information on these subjects, write to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATSI-MI, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613, or call AV 821-1975/76, or Commercial (602) 533-1975/76.

# TOTAL FORCE



By Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

## Real World Transition

If you're leaving active duty and are frustrated in your search for the right Guard or Reserve unit, please don't leave the system. Our country needs you, and there are productive, rewarding career opportunities out there. For instance, your transition counselor can assign you to a specific MI unit regardless of geography, if your intelligence and language skills match a troop unit requirement. This program is called MISTE—MI Special Training Element. Negotiations are underway to have the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) manage this innovative effort. Currently, each Army area has a point of contact for assignments.

Yet, there are times when a good MI soldier can't make the MISTE connection, but can still serve in an RC MI slot. The solution is simple. First, don't accept a discharge unless you can find a good unit to go to. Go to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Soldiers in the IRR are a valued mobilization asset and have all sorts of training options. You can—

- Serve 2 to 3 weeks of annual training with your old unit.
- Be assigned to one of the 20,000 individual mobilization augmentation slots.
- Be waiting for that just-right unit vacancy in your home town and participate year round.

POC at the ARPERCEN for IRR MI is Major Hamera (DSN 892-3820 or 800-325-4988).

## Feed the Proponent

This is my sixth column for the MIPB, and one thing I've learned is that I need your feedback. In fact, this column depends upon it. Ideas and proposals presented here come from your telephone calls and written comments. It's critical that your dialogue with the proponent continue. Remember, the Army Reserve and National Guard comprise some 35 percent of the MI Total Force. With Army structure changes and a "build down" of the Active Component, our RC MI will be more important than ever.

I've received varied comments on the Life Cycle Model Assignment System for RC MI sol-

diers in the last issue. If you have any experience with this model or with a cross assignment between the Army Reserve and the Army Guard, let me know. I'm interested in specific case examples. We want to target key states in which MI has a significant troop unit presence such as Utah, California, Texas, Maryland, and Louisiana. We want to develop MI upward mobility slots in artillery, engineering, and other units with MI slots. This will be a discussion item at the next RC MI Advisory Committee meeting in December here at Fort Huachuca.

The bottom line is that I encourage you not only to read this magazine, but also to subscribe and contribute. Each MI unit, AC or RC, receives a few copies, but we need more MI soldiers to subscribe. The cost is only \$6.50 a year, and it's tax deductible! A handy subscription form is included in this issue.

## MI Reviews and Conferences

A list of scheduled MI events follows.

**97L in-progress reviews.** 97L, the soon to be established linguist MOS for the Total Army, is on the fast track out of the MI Proponent Office and the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), our capstone partner in Utah. We're sponsoring a continuing series of in-progress reviews at Fort Huachuca and Draper, Utah. Point of contact at the proponent is Mr. Delajoux (DSN 533-1975/73); and at the 300th, Major Nelson (DSN 924-5207/08).

**The ARNG MI Conference.** Portland, Oregon, will host this year's conference from October 25 to 27. POC is Colonel Dale H. Decker (DSN 355-3618, or commercial [503] 378-3618). This annual session allows both Guard and Reserve MI leaders to work together. It provides Guard MI units a forum in which to focus issues for bureau leadership at the Pentagon. Last year's session in New Jersey set a quality standard. I look forward to seeing you in Oregon this year.

**The RC MI Advisory Committee meeting.** Fort Huachuca will host this annual RC meeting from December 5 to 7. Last January, Colonel Wayne Zajak chaired the productive executive session, which emphasized Guard issues. We anticipate that some basic Army structure deci-

sions will have been made by then and the newly established Reserve Command will be in operation. The Proponent wants to discuss a closer working relationship with our Reserve Force Intelligence Schools and to review our expanded evaluation efforts with the Regional Training Sites-Intelligence. We anticipate a good session.

### Army Reserve Command

The newly established Army Reserve Command is in provisional operation in Atlanta. The command will become operational this October and assume CONUSA responsibilities as these Army commands close operations. This important milestone for the Reserve will ensure greater commitment to resourcing a solid Army Reserve MI Force. The MI Proponent looks forward to a positive and cooperative relationship.

### Guard Representative Arrives

The National Guard role in MI has increased significantly in the last few years. In fact, 60 percent of RC soldiers training here at the Intelligence School are from the Guard. In recognition of this and in response to a Proponent request, the Guard Bureau has assigned Lieutenant Colonel Dave Miner to USAIC&FH. Dave is a talented MI soldier, Chinese linguist, and Pentagon veteran—a real winner! He can be reached at the Home of MI at DSN 821-1176/77.

### Another Revision to RC MIOAC

Yes, it's true. TRADOC has directed the Intelligence School to reconfigure the RC MI Officer Advanced Course from two resident phases to one. This is due to the added requirement for all RC officers to complete a 2-week resident phase

of the RC-Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) for promotion to major. So it's important that you be on alert for this change.

In Summer 94, the RC MIOAC will be 2 phases with Phase 1 as correspondence and Phase 2 as residence. Phase 1 is a prerequisite for Phase 2. Phase 2 will be based on MQS tasks for MI captains. Because of the intensity of the new course, a prerequisite for attendance will be completion of either the 6-month MI Officer Basic Course (OBC) or the 2-month MI Officer Transition Course (OTC) at Fort Huachuca.

The Intelligence School is also developing an RC configured OTC for RC officers who want to branch transfer to MI but haven't taken MIOBC and can't leave their jobs for 2 months. These officers must complete this RC MI OTC of 14 days in residence at Fort Huachuca before attending the RC MIOAC.

Non-MI RC officers assigned to MI slots who do not wish to branch transfer to MI will also take the MI OTC to become 35D qualified. More on this will follow, but stay in touch with the Proponent on these career significant changes. POC in DOTD is Major Kloor, DSN 821-2085.

### Inside Back Cover

The unit crest featured in this issue is the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist). Future issues will present its capstone MI battalions from Hawaii to Maryland. Good stuff on another valuable MI unit.

*Colonel Joe Mesch is the Reserve Forces Advisor to the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He can be reached at DSN 821-1176, Commercial (602) 533-1176, home (602) 459-6893, or by mail, ATTN: ATSI-RA.*

## CAREER NOTES

### DIRNSA Fellowship Selection Board

The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) Fellowship Selection Board will meet December 10. To apply, send an informal letter which briefly synthesizes your SIGINT and MI experiences to MI Branch by November 29.

The DIRNSA Fellowship program is designed to help develop top SIGINT performers into future leaders of the cryptologic community. This program exposes them to the executive level

NSA/central security service (CSS) decision making process. The selectee will work 1 year for the DIRNSA in a variety of educational and professional development positions.

To compete, an officer must—

- Be a career cryptologist with a rank of major or lieutenant colonel.
- Have demonstrated outstanding performance and high potential.
- Be a graduate of a command and staff col-

lege.

- Meet PCS stability requirements of 5/6 completion of OCONUS tour or 24 months on station of a CONUS tour.

The selectee will be notified by February 28, 1992. Service begins in October 1992, but may vary slightly due to the selectee's availability.

### ACS Selection Board

The MI Branch Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) Selection Board will meet October 16. Application deadline is October 5.

When filling out applications, use the guidance in AR 621-1, 1985 version. The 1618-R forms must list three disciplines and three separate schools, with at least one granting in-state tuition. Send official transcripts and GRE scores with applications.

To compete, an officer must—

- Have demonstrated outstanding professional and academic performance.
- Be an advanced course graduate.
- Possess tactical MI experience.
- Meet PCS stability requirements of 5/6 tour completion for OCONUS tours or 24 months on station for CONUS tours as of June 1st.

- Possess less than 17 years of active federal commissioned service.

MI branch usually receives four quotas per fiscal year. Disciplines available include EW systems technology, artificial intelligence, computer science, computer software engineering, space systems engineering and operations, physics, and electrical engineering. There may also be some social science/area studies opportunities next year. A 3-day service obligation is incurred for every 1 day of schooling.

We'll release results by mid-December, and notify officers by letter of their selection or nonselection.

### JOCCP Board

The MI Branch Junior Officer Career Cryptologic Program (JOCCP) selection board will meet on October 30. To apply, submit an informal letter application to MI Branch by October 18.

JOCCP is a 3-year program to develop the cryptologic skills and management practices of junior officers for leadership roles in cryptologic assignments. Selectees will PCS to NSA. The 3-year program consists of 6-month blocks in different areas within NSA as well as SIGINT courses taught at NSA. Officers will receive ASI 3W upon completion of JOCCP. Follow-on assignments are

normally to SIGINT positions, depending on the officer's professional development needs.

To compete, an officer must—

- Possess less than 12 years of active federal commissioned service.
- Be an advanced course graduate.
- Have demonstrated outstanding performance.

- Possess tactical MI experience.

- Be eligible to PCS between May and September 1992 and meet PCS stability requirements of 5/6 tour completion for OCONUS tours and a minimum of 24 months on station for CONUS tours.

Your application must indicate that the eligibility criteria have been met. Include a brief summary of your military background and career objectives in the SIGINT/EW field. Two letters of recommendation are permitted but not required. We will release results once NSA has made its selections, usually by late December or early January 1992.

### PGIP Selection Board

The Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP) Selection Board for fiscal year 1992 will meet September 30. Applications are due to MI Branch by September 20.

PGIP is a 9-month program conducted by the Defense Intelligence College, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. The curriculum emphasizes policy and strategic intelligence in the joint environment. PGIP students train as strategic intelligence analysts. With permission from the Defense Intelligence College, officers may compete for a Master's of Science in Strategic Intelligence (MSSI), in addition to completing the required PGIP curriculum. Officers must submit official transcripts and GRE scores before reporting to PGIP.

To compete, an officer must—

- Be eligible to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course (a captain or promotable first lieutenant who hasn't attended MIOAC or a first lieutenant selected for retention by a DA-level retention board).

- Have demonstrated outstanding performance and potential.

- Be 35D trained.

- Possess a bachelor's degree and have a demonstrated ability to complete graduate work. This is usually indicated by an undergraduate GPA of 2.5 or above.

- Have a final Top Secret clearance with



access to special intelligence.

- Possess a strong tactical background.
- Be eligible for reassignment during January 1 and August 1, 1992.
- Meet PCS stability requirements of 5/6 tour completion for OCONUS tours and a minimum of 24 months on station for CONUS tours.

Submit a one- or two-page informal application letter to MI Branch by September 20. Two letters of recommendation are permitted but not required.

In the past, many officers waited until the last minute to apply. Their applications and transcripts arrived too late to be considered so they lost the opportunity to attend. Again, the cutoff date is September 20. Get your paperwork in early! The letter should say the officer meets the eligibility criteria and should include a brief synopsis of MI experience. Enclose college tran-

scripts if not already in your file. If you intend to compete for the MSSI Program, enclose your GRE scores. All selectees must submit one copy of official transcripts to the Defense Intelligence College before reporting to PGIP.

The application must have chain of command endorsement. If a CONUS stability break or foreign service tour curtailment is required, include a DA Form 4187 submitted through the appropriate AG/G1 to PERSCOM.

The board will release results by mid-December. For more information, write to MI Branch at the above address or call AV 221-0143/45. To compete for any of the above programs, mail your application to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-OPF-M (name of program), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0415. For more information, call Captain Gould at AV 221-0143/45.

## VANTAGE POINT *(Continued from page 2)*

enable them to function successfully as intelligence staff officers at any echelon. Officers requiring added training in a particular discipline to meet the prerequisites of a specific follow-on assignment will be given that training as an add-on.

Concurrent with the restructuring of the MIOAC, the Command and General Staff College has begun refocusing the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) to teach combined arms tactics. Under this concept, MI and other branch officers will go to their various branch advanced courses on a PCS basis, then upon graduation proceed immediately to Fort Leavenworth to attend the new tactics oriented CAS3 on a TDY basis. The focus of the CAS3 course will be to train company grade officers to fight as a combined arms team. This program should be implemented in calendar year 1992.

We've begun testing MIOBC students to verify their ability to execute MQS I skills to standard. Training in these skills is now part of all officers' precommissioning training. We've been pleased with results to date—over 80 percent of the lieutenants are passing the verification test, and those not passing are correcting the deficiencies rapidly.

We've just completed our MI input to the MQS

II skills lists. These branch peculiar skills, plus common Army skills for lieutenants, will be verified in diagnostic tests administered in the first weeks of MI officer advanced courses starting first quarter, FY 92. MQS II skills for captains will be verified at the beginning of CAS3. MQS II task books will be published late this summer. Individual officers will be expected to train themselves to meet MQS II standards. Commanders must support their officers in satisfying these requirements.

AirLand Battle Future, or AirLand Operations as it is now called, is continuing to mature. This new war-fighting doctrine is exciting and places great demands on intelligence to know precisely where the enemy is and is not, and to target accurately across the battlefield and, especially, deep.

The "student body left" envelopment, executed so brilliantly during Operation DESERT STORM, epitomizes the offensive orientation of AirLand Operations. The outstanding contributions of the prototype Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the interim Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to Operation DESERT STORM also provided insight into the type of battlefield visibility and targeting accuracies we can expect with the new family of intelligence systems now in the program. More detail on AirLand Operations will be available soon with the publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, *AirLand Operations*.

Finally, on July 12, we will hold our annual MI

Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony. We'll induct seven new members: Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Nick" Nicholson, Jr. (posthumously); Colonel (Ret) John "Jack" Pattison; Colonel (Ret) Duwayne C. Lundgren; Mr. Herbert S. Hovey, Jr.;

Colonel John F. Aiso (posthumously); Mr. Paul Shoemaker; and CWO (Ret) Robert Leigh. Also on July 12, we'll celebrate the 29th anniversary of the founding of our Branch and the fourth anniversary of the founding of the MI Corps.

*(Continued from page 5)*

tify and eliminate redundancy. The RCs have participated in the SMDR for only 2 years, but we're already seeing it work. Uncoordinated class scheduling and unnecessary redundancy are being eliminated.

Second, RC training is more effective when classes are provided close to where the students live. The Reserve units have limited school funds. Increasing travel costs decreases the number of students who can go to school. Most MI units are located far away from Fort Huachuca. Thus, centralizing the ITAAS there will increase travel costs, with the associated negative effect on the unit's budgets.

The TRADOC affiliation program already directs the Proponent to train Reserve instructors and maintain their skills. We need to improve in this area, but changing an already working school system is not the answer. Making the existing affiliation program work is the answer. A better solution would be to bring ITAAS course managers to Fort Huachuca annually for refresher training. The course managers would, in turn, train their instructors.

Finally, bringing hundreds of students across the country to maintain standards is far more costly than sending three- or four-person inspection teams from the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES) to the training sites. DOES inspections are extremely beneficial to ITAAS and are

welcomed by the schools. Funding DOES teams must be a high priority for the Intelligence Center.

Centralization would adversely affect ITAAS year-round operations. First, it would limit recruiting ITAAS unit members. Second, it would preclude effective training during weekend drills (Inactive Duty Training (IDT)). The ITAAS also needs a dispersion in order to recruit. While many ITAAS personnel travel unusually long distances, this isn't the norm for the average unit member. MI specialties are low-density, which means there aren't large concentrations of MI soldiers to provide members for the ITAAS.

Next, RC MI courses already consist of numerous phases. With instruction provided only during the 2-week Active training period, it can take up to 4 years to reclassify and make an NCO fully MOS qualified. This is too long. We need to develop IDT phases to shorten the time required to produce MOS qualified personnel. By its nature, IDT training must be taken to the soldiers. This requires an even greater dispersion of ITAAS personnel throughout a CONUSA area.

Greater dispersion will stress the span of control and increase the ITAAS unit's administrative requirements. The dispersion required to support RC needs will create a span of control requiring regionally based ITAAS. A single centralized ITAAS couldn't control

the many detachments needed.

Will the need exist to support this much training? Colonel Mesch writes: "The AC downsizing will thus lessen ITAAS teaching requirements." Perhaps, but I sincerely doubt it. If anything, any lessening will be only for a short time. The Reserves historically have a 33 percent turnover rate. Thus, we can project a need to train one third of the MI soldiers each year. With a higher personnel fill rate, the teaching requirement may actually increase. This is especially likely for language sustainment.

The lessons learned from DESERT STORM show us the challenge for the future. We don't need to centralize the ITAAS. We need only implement the existing requirements to improve the already working program. Creation of a fully resourced ITAAS TDA is the critical corrective action needed. After that, if we lack needed courses, the Proponent must develop them so ITAAS can teach them before mobilization. Implementing the affiliation program work will enhance the ITAAS program.

Fortunately, we can continue to rely on the quality of ITAAS soldiers. Their professionalism and dedication will carry us through the difficulties ahead and produce the qualified soldiers we need in the Reserve forces.

**Major John C. Andrews, Jr.**  
ITAAS Program Manager  
First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, MD

# PROFESSIONAL READING



**The Soviet Union and India** by Peter J. S. Duncan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), 150 pages, \$14.95.

This book examines the relations between the USSR and India from 1971 to the present. It maintains that India's support of Soviet foreign policy issues arises from a coincidence of interests rather than from Soviet pressure.

The 1971 India-Pakistan War, which led to Bangladesh's independence, brought the USSR and India together. If the USSR hadn't supported the Indians and East Bengalis, India may not have won the war. The U.S. actively supported Pakistan. India's victory, and the subsequent breakup of Pakistan, made India the dominant power in South Asia and reduced the need for a Soviet presence in that region.

India currently gets about 60 percent of its arms from the Soviets. The ultimate technology transfer to date has been the 4-year lease of a nuclear-powered cruise missile-equipped Charlie submarine. The Indians, especially, benefit from this military relationship since the Soviets have always given them their latest and most sensitive technology first. The Indian armed forces, the

third largest in the world with 1,262,000 men, have become the superpower in the Indian Ocean region. Since 1971, India has procured military equipment and built up military forces which can project power from Africa to the Straits of Magellan.

Since India is already involved in conflicts with China and because of its geographical location on the southern Soviet frontier, policy makers in Moscow see a friendly India as a counterweight to China.

One of the more interesting chapters describes how, in 1971, President Nixon's approach to China led the Indians to fear the U.S. nuclear umbrella would no longer protect them from China. This prompted the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, to order the development of a nuclear bomb. Duncan also explores the political ties wherein India, as leader of the nonaligned countries, bolsters the Soviet position, no matter what the issue.

The book describes other aspects of the relationship as well. Economic data on trade and financial support to India are laid out, as is the probable economic future of India.

Duncan has given a remarkable analysis of how India fits into Soviet policy toward Southwest Asia and China. I recommend this book to anyone interested in India-USSR ties. The military relationship is discussed only within the context of economic aid provided, but the economic and political information is, indeed, valuable.

First Lieutenant  
Gilles Van Nederveen  
Bolling AFB, D.C.

**Operation White Star** by Richard O. Sutton (Daring Books), 296 pages, \$18.95, hardcover, fiction.

The cover shows the unofficial patch

of Special Forces soldiers who served in Operation White Star under MAAG Laos in the early 1960's, giving the impression the book is a fictionalized story about that operation. Little has been written about that operation or those Special Forces soldiers, which has left a void in our military literature. However, the cover is misleading. In fact, you have to read nearly half the book before you get to Laos, by way of long, boring passages devoted to tactical training, static line parachute operations, and other mundane aspects of Special Forces life. The book fails to pass the "so what?" test of relevancy: Although mildly entertaining, it offers the reader no special insights into human character or events.

It weaves its story with racial and cultural stereotypes, including a bewildered West Point lieutenant, a fat alcoholic captain nicknamed "Whiskey," a homicidal Italian-American NCO who's served time on a prison farm in Texas, illiterate and hostile North Carolina rednecks who get beaten up by Special Forces men, and crooked, ungrateful Orientals. There's nothing in this book that hasn't been said before, only better. I recommend readers pass on this one.

Major William H. Burgess, III  
Fort Bragg, NC

**U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War** by Shelby Stanton (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1989), Hardcover, 246 pages, Glossary, 400 photos, \$24.95 (\$33.50 Canadian).

The author was an officer in the Vietnam War. He's produced an extensive, well documented book on Army uniforms worn during that war. One of the first treatments of this subject on the market, it satisfies the historian's need for accurate documentation and sources. The author used regulations and direc-

tives to tell his story, and extensive notes in each chapter to further document variations.

Stanton gives "official" descriptions of uniforms and equipment and provides photos of their actual use in the field. This book does a very good job of tracing uniforms and equipment from their conception at U.S. Army Natick Laboratories to field tests and use in Vietnam. This, by the way, is one of the few accounts of the war produced with the cooperation of DOD, as evidenced by its "issue" Army photos.

I'd like to have seen more on weapons and unit insignia, which might have tied together comments in the text about the use of nonstandard uniforms. Yet, these are minor flaws in an otherwise well written and produced work. This book could serve as either a standard reference work or simply an enjoyable read.

Captain Rich Ugino  
ARNG  
Buffalo, NY

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**Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition**, Edited by Robert A. Fitton (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), \$19.95.

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Leadership is the cornerstone of our profession, and this marvelous book gives an excellent description of its demands and complexities by drawing on the words and wit of the past. Fitton, an Army lieutenant colonel, has produced an invaluable reference for military leaders, commanders, and instructors.

The book's scope is as broad as its subject. Fitton has collected over 1,000 quotations and arranged them into 80 topics, from traditional leadership topics like "Duty" and "Caring" to more unusual ones like "Mistakes" and "Luck, Fate." The quotes come from a wide variety of authors and from every period of history, including quotations from great military leaders like Patton, Lee, and Napoleon. The author also quotes authors like Emerson and Voltaire, statesmen like Churchill and Gandhi, and sources like the Bible and Aesop's Fables.

Fitton provides nine readings on leadership, including General MacArthur's farewell speech to West

Point and Rogers' Standing Orders. This section also includes an outstanding address, "Know Your Men—Know Your Business—Know Yourself."

The book is extremely well indexed, and quotations are accessible by either author or topic. Readers will want to browse through this entertaining and instructive reference.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow  
Fort Huachuca, AZ



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**General Patton's Principles: For Life and Leadership** by Porter B. Williamson (Tucson: Management & Systems Consultants, Inc., 1988), 261 pages, \$7.00.

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Although this book came highly recommended, I was disappointed in it. Because of its redundancy and grammatical and spelling errors, clarity and presentation suffer. Personal "war stories" abound and Williamson needlessly pontificates on everything from excessive philosophizing to "lessons" in child rearing. With only a few exceptions, there's a lack of historical context and documentation. Also, the author's near worship of General Patton deprives him of any objectivity toward his subject.

The book's true value lies in its ability to echo select Patton virtues and tenets: "We can always learn from each other," "always do everything you ask of those you command," "talk with the troops," "know what you know and know what you do not know," and "success is how you bounce on the bottom." Despite

its many shortfalls, the book gives several sound lessons in leadership.

Captain David B. Kneafsey  
Fort Huachuca, AZ

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**Foundations of the Nazi Police State, The Formation of SIPO and SD** by George C. Browder (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 346 pages, \$35.00.

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This is the first comprehensive study of how the Gestapo and all the other police units were united under the SIPO (Security Police) and tied to the SD (the security service of the party and the SS). Browder tells how the National Socialist Party was formed and operated and gives a detailed account of the formation of the SS under Heinrich Himmler. He describes how Germany was organized and how it functioned, from a police standpoint.

After the Versailles Treaty, Germany was a federation of states with decentralized police forces in each state. The Nazis infiltrated state and other police forces until 1936, when all those forces were brought under centralized control. Inner party struggles over control of these police forces dominated the period. Some party leaders opposed Himmler and his SS; for example, Roehm and his SA storm troopers, and conservative nationalists like Frink in the Reich Interior Ministry. Hermann Goering, a powerful rival to Himmler in police matters, controlled Prussia, the largest state in Germany.

In both Prussia and Bavaria, the SA established concentration camps without Nazi party authority, which proved to be an embarrassment to the SS and Hitler. As Himmler, Goering, and Frink fought for control of a new "Reich" police force, SA opposition was eliminated in 1934 when Roehm and the other SA leaders were executed. The "Second Revolution" was a power struggle between Nazi party conservatives and SA revolutionaries. In June 1933, War Minister General Blomberg and Reichspresident von Hindenburg threatened Hitler with a military coup unless he did something about these internal party "tensions." The SA had been a constant challenge with its flagrant law-



lessness, unofficial concentration camps, and torture chambers.

In 1934, under Reinhard Heydrich, the SD began a campaign to remove Party officials opposed to Himmler's police force. Investigations into party corruption were a common tactic. Himmler slowly assumed control over all SS detachments in Germany and was named Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the Political Police in most of Germany. This constituted a major victory over Frink and Goering. Heydrich, Himmler's brilliant assistant, was able to assume control over party intelligence organizations. This power monopoly was sanctioned by the party leadership: Hess, Bormann, and Hitler.

To further expand the SS and to counter the military, Himmler built both the SS police system and the Waffen SS which would later challenge the military. As the SS and Himmler's power over the police grew, Heydrich expanded his secret service and soon ran afoul of the armed forces secret service, the Abwehr. The Abwehr had traditionally handled espionage and sabotage cases. Under Heydrich, the Gestapo also began cross-border operations. In 1936, after successfully winning a series of bureaucratic and personal conflicts, Himmler became chief of the German police, which now spanned the entire Reich.

The police were organized into the *Ordnungspolizei* and the *Sicherheitspolizei* (Sipo). Heydrich became leader of the Sipo and Kurt Dalwege became chief of the *Ordnungspolizei*. The fusion of the Sipo and the SD in the person of Heydrich formed the heart of the National Socialist police state. This organization was responsible for the terror and mass murder in the Third Reich. The formation of the Sipo culminated in totalitarian efforts to achieve conformity and end opposition to the regime. As the police state grew, so did terrorism, and eventually, genocide. Interestingly enough, the book describes Himmler as, among other things, an able planner, organizer, salesman, and political strategist.

This political organizational narrative details the power struggles, and unravels the complexities of the Sipo and SD development. Those interested in CI and totalitarian

regimes will find this book informative and thorough. This is a specialist's text, and historians will find the new research for this book extremely detailed.

First Lieutenant  
Gilles Van Nederveen  
Bolling AFB, D.C.

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**The First Air War, 1914-1918** by  
Lee Kennett (New York: The Free  
Press, 1991), 275 pages, \$24.95.

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Lee Kennett aptly compares the World War I air war to "some imperfectly explored country." Some parts, like the Red Baron and his dashing fighter pilot comrades, are well-trod. Other parts, like aerial reconnaissance, have been left uncharted. With this book, Kennett aims to provide a better overview of the air war, one where all parts are discernible. And he succeeds brilliantly. This book is interesting and readable enough for the general reader, while the depth of its research makes it particularly useful for World War I buffs and students of air power development. I recommend it to both.

The scope of Kennett's book is sweeping. He first examines the genesis of air power before World War I. Then, moving to the war itself, he describes the men, missions, and machines of the air forces. As the war progressed, the aircraft's role became more defined while tactics and formations became more complex. To trace these developments, Kennett skillfully blends operational, social, organizational, and technological military history.


Kennett's account is well-balanced. Many accounts of the World War I air war treat it as little more than an Anglo-German duel, neglecting the French role. Kennett gives a more even account and describes the prominent role of the French air force, which, in 1918, was the largest. Although concentrating on the Western Front, he doesn't neglect the air war over the Eastern, Italian, and Balkan fronts. He also covers naval aviation's role.

To gain this balance, Kennett did an astonishing amount of research. He explored and used French, German, British, and American official records, memoirs, and scholarly works. He ties this research together

in a gracefully written, often humorous, and always informative narrative. The result is not only a well-balanced history, but also one that puts the air war into proper perspective.

While no single volume can ever provide the complete story, Kennett ensures that all parts of the World War I air war are accurately covered in his very readable book. It's unfortunate that probably only specialists will read this excellent history.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow  
Fort Huachuca, AZ



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**Every Spy A Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community** by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990), 433 pages, \$24.95.

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The recent Persian Gulf war that the United States and its allies waged against Iraq brought Israel onto the battlefield, if only on the sidelines. Since Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel caused few casualties, Saddam Hussein was thwarted in his efforts to bring Israel into the conflict. This is current background for this highly interesting book on the secret side of Israel by two distinguished journalists, Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman.

The reader gets a detailed look inside Israel's secret intelligence services from the inception of the state of Israel until the present. The authors portray the men and their highly secret missions, those that

failed and some that brilliantly succeeded. The authors describe the history of Israel's three main intelligence agencies: The Mossad, primarily used for foreign operations; the Shin Bet, whose responsibility is domestic security; and the Aman, the army's intelligence agency.

The authors point out that Isser Harel is credited with bringing Israel's secret services, especially the Mossad, to the fore. Harel was the godfather of the Mossad, its organizer, master tactician, and the man who provided Israel with the means to covertly defend itself against its Arab neighbors.

The book also discusses the American connection and Israel's most trusted friend in the CIA, James Jesus Angelton. It was Angelton who agreed to exchange intelligence between Israel and the United States in 1951, a policy that has grown over the years.

One of the most interesting parts of the book is the authors' description of the secret ties between Israel and certain nations that, on the surface, aren't known for their friendship with the Jewish state: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, various regimes in South America, and various ex-Soviet block nations like Romania.

Much of the book is a highly informative narration of how Israeli secret intelligence services helped thousands of Jews worldwide to emigrate to Israel, sometimes, through payoffs and other covert deals.

Among the most spectacular intelligence successes are the kidnapping of Adolph Eichmann, the rescue of civilians on the raid at Entebbe, the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and the capture of a Soviet radar installation in Egypt in 1970.

The authors describe the darker side of Israel's intelligence failures, such as the Pollard affair, the killings of hundreds of Palestinians in Lebanon, the exposing of the Jewish terrorist organization that killed Palestinian students, and the attempted murder of three West Bank mayors. Also included is Israel's role in the Iran-Contra scandal and the kidnapping of Mordecai Vanunu, a scientist who gave Israel's atomic secrets to the British press.

**Every Spy A Prince** is one of

the most detailed and comprehensive accounts to date of Israel's intelligence community. At times it reads so much like a novel, that one has to remember that it's not fiction. With Israel once more on the front pages, this is a must read for anyone who wants to learn more about the men who made that small nation's covert army into one of the most respected agencies in the world.

Peter Kross  
North Brunswick, NJ

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**The Commanders** by Bob Woodward (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 398 pages, \$24.95.

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Rather than reading this book, the military professional will probably want to wait for more substantive histories of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Although interesting and sometimes informative, this book shouldn't startle or horrify the informed observer. Moreover, as history, it's suspect. Written for the eager general reader, this book offers little of substance to the military professional.

As America and its allies moved toward their stunning victory over Iraq, much of America fed on an image of unity among its top leadership. Woodward offers an alternate view. In his insider's account of military decision making during the first 2 years of the Bush presidency, he argues that the road to war was filled with surprise, disagreements, and reluctance. He portrays a military often scrambling to keep up with the hawkish decisions of its president.

Woodward builds his story around the key military decision makers, especially Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. After setting the stage, he uses about one third of his book to describe the discussions and decisions preceding Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989. The rest of the book describes the events leading up to DESERT STORM. Woodward reconstructs these events with verbatim conversations, accounts of critical meetings, and short detailed chronologies (how he got these is, of course, questionable).

In these conversations and meet-

ings, Woodward portrays the military leadership sometimes dragging its feet toward DESERT STORM. General Powell favored economic sanctions rather than war against Iraq, but was unable to convince President Bush. In October, even General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander in the Gulf, admitted that he wasn't sold on offensive operations as a solution. Both generals were at times caught off guard and unprepared as the president moved toward war. Once the decision for war was made, however, both leaders did their best to make victory certain.

Although hardly definitive, Woodward's book has some merit. In a lively and readable style, he weaves together the military events of the first 2 years of Bush's administration. In the process, he makes the military leaders human, giving them wives, homes, and ambitions. As a result, he provides a good primer for Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

But Woodward's theme of disagreement and reluctance shouldn't surprise anyone. At best, war is chaos, and its preparation only a little less so. Arguments, debates, and changes occur regularly as a nation goes to war, so the disagreements over when, how, and why are only normal. Likewise, the military leaders' reluctance to go to war is normal—they know the price of war is often death.

As a student of history, I'm leery about this book: Woodward gives no sources. True, he writes that he spent over 2 years interviewing more than 400 people, but he never lists them. And he never cites who gave what information. This is especially important since he often puts thoughts into his character's heads and words in their mouths. Without the support of a source, I suspect that Woodward is guessing.

Woodward's book is certainly interesting and lively to read, but I suggest that military readers wait for more useful histories.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow  
Fort Huachuca, AZ



## 300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist) Army National Guard

*Oriental blue and silver gray are traditionally associated with Military Intelligence. The scroll and quill allude to research and the study of languages. The four arrows pointing outward refer to the unit's global service and the processing of information. The gold wreath symbolizes the unit's goal of excellence and achievement.*

As both an intelligence unit and a linguist unit, the 300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist) is unique in the Total Force. It provides SIGINT and HUMINT support in some 35 languages. The 300th traces its lineage back over 30 years to the 142d MI Linguist Company, which was organized in February 1960 with some 50 interrogators,

analysts, translators, and editors. Utah was selected as the site for the unit because of its large number of citizens with excellent language skills and in-depth knowledge of cultures based on extensive foreign service as Latter Day Saints missionaries.

On April 1, 1980, the unit became a battalion with a headquarters element and three line companies, all located in Utah. Due to a shortage of experienced active-duty linguists, the 142d became involved in all facets of intelligence work, including providing CI support to AC MI units in Europe; briefing intelligence to allied units during NATO exercises in Western Europe; providing strategic debriefing support to MI EAC units; working with the U.S. military liaison mission throughout the world; and translating, interpreting, and preparing briefings for senior officers in meetings and conferences with foreign officials.

As Army requirements for linguists grew, the 142d MI Battalion grew to meet these needs. In March 1988, the battalion became the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist). The expansion of the 300th beyond Utah's borders occurred in 1989 with the establishment of seven battalions, five of which are outside Utah: 141st and 142d, Utah; 223d, California; 260th, Florida; 341st, Washington State; 415th, Louisiana; and the 368th (USAR) in Hawaii. The 300th is the capstone for these MI linguist battalions and provides substantive guidance to make sure the brigade's language skills remain the best in the Army.

The 300th conducts some 250 training missions annually—both MI and direct linguist support for the Army worldwide, including language support for exercises overseas; administrative support to the FORSCOM language training courses at Brigham Young University; linguist augmentation to U.S. Army South and the School of the Americas; linguist teams to train Army interrogators; CI support; and an increasing role in counterdrugs.

Currently, the 300th provides instructor support to the Reserve Forces School in Salt Lake City for interrogation and CI training. The 300th has been recognized for excellence in training with several Eisenhower Awards and CONUSA awards.

Recently, the 300th provided linguists and interrogators in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A Company, 142d MI Battalion (L), was activated with a total of 98 soldiers deployed. They were assigned to joint facilities and tactical locations along the borders throughout the Kuwaiti Theater.



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